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ABSTRACT
The aim of the thesis is to investigate the differences in perceptions towards corporate
governance practices on the boards of joint ventures between international or domestic private
firms and Egyptian state-owned companies using the oil and gas industry as a case study. A
questionnaire was distributed to 13 oil and gas joint venture companies where 100 board
members completed the survey. The study reveals the barriers hindering board effectiveness
between the domestic and international board members. The differences towards governance
practices do exist between local- Egyptian board members who represent the state as an owner,
Egyptians representing the private partner, and foreign board members or joint venture boards.
The results of the questionnaire shows that nearly half of foreign board members are not satisfied
with the board composition and the capabilities of the directors which are considered an
important factor in achieving board effectiveness. Nearly half of the Egyptian board members
representing the private partner support the view that that the board is not allowed having an
access to information in the right time, in contrast to the views of their foreign counterpart. In
addition, there is a need for board members to dedicate more time to strategy, performance,
talent, and risk management. Nearly half of the foreign board members support the bringing of
independent directors into their boards. As for the agenda and materials preparation given to
board, almost half of the foreign board members see the need for improving the preparation of
board meeting materials and for actively engaging in discussions during the meetings to achieve
board efficiency.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, SOEs, local and foreign Board members, Oil and Gas joint
ventures, Egypt.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
Enhancing Board effectiveness is considered a fundamental instrument and one of the
centerpieces of corporate governance in any enterprise (Menozzi et.al, 2010; Aguilera, 2005;
IFC, 2010; OECD, 2007).
However, the hefty differences that separate corporate governance‘s national models cause
foreign board members to reach divergent conclusions as to the way, the practices and issues of
corporate governance – related to improving the board effectiveness - should be tackled and
followed if compared to their local counterparts (EU Corporate Governance Framework, 2011).
This leads to major differences resulting in higher management complexity and conflicts in a
Joint Venture (JV, hereafter) (Bogun, 2008) and consequently lead to a no-win governance
situation and to the formation of a confused board which therefore results in a confused company
(Ward 2000). According to Bogun (2008), research has confirmed the inner workings of an IJV
board are considered challenging if they are compared to those of an unitary firm, mainly
because of continuing active cooperation established between two or more partner firms
(Oseichuk et al., 2009). What weakens the performance of the board of directors are cultural
differences pertaining to practices, values, and ethics, dissimilar motivations, restricted
communication, the pressures and expectations of parent firms, higher need to create personal
connections with the other side, many calls for resources, vague and intricate network borders,
and unclear information flow(Hofstede, 1980; Salk and Shenkar, 2001).
It was found that those firms that are monitored, controlled, and governed according to
international best practices tended to be more successful in terms of profitability and growth

10

(Oseichuk et al., 2009). Conversely, it was also noticed that those enterprises lacking in proper
corporate governance practices are more susceptible to poor performance, leakage, and
insolvency (Oseichuk et al., 2009).
Corporate governance encompasses transparency and ensures that the board, who are
considered the representatives of the owners of the organization, are guarding resources as well
as allocating them to make planned progress towards the defined targets of the organization.
Corporate governance also focuses on the issue that board is held appropriately to account by
stakeholders (ACCA, 2009).Therefore, structuring corporate governance to ensure board
effectiveness is crucial. Several mechanisms have been developed to make sure that companies
are managed in an effective manner in a way to achieve a maximization of value for both
shareholders and stakeholders (Aguilera, 2005).
According to Wang et al. (2009) , globalization is the process by which the global economy is
transformed from a group of national and regional markets into a group of markets which
operates without the existence of national boundaries (Thomas, 2012). Globalization allows
private sector firms to transfer operations to countries where sound corporate governance as well
as sound ethical practices are seen to dominate in business. Different researchers Ahunwan,
(2002), Armstrong (2003), McKinsey and Co. (2002) as cited by Thomas (2012) point out to the
negative effect of the perceptions of corruption on international foreign direct investment to
developing countries. Rossouw (2005), in this way, suggests that there has been a recognition in
Africa that good corporate governance can draw local and foreign investment as well as it can
prevent both corruption and unethical business practices that damage the business image of
Africa.
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In the late 1990s Egypt had begun to place a considerable importance on the issue of corporate
governance for the realization of a better economic performance and a higher sustainable
production and growth rates (Fawzy, 2003, the Egyptian Code of Corporate governance for the
Public Enterprise Sector, 2006, and Dahawy, 2008).
Egypt had undertaken extensive measures in an attempt to shape up its corporate governance
practices (Dahawy, 2008). In October 2005 the EIOD1 of the Ministry of Investment had
published a Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Enterprises in the stock market (the
Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance for the Public Enterprise Sector, 2006). In 2006 Egypt
has utilized the OECD guidelines for Governance of State-Owned enterprises and adapted it to
conform to its laws and regulations (Gamal, 2010). Another code or guidelines of corporate
governance had been issued. That voluntary code served as a guidebook for state-owned
enterprise in order to be able to compete with the private sector on an equal footing
(Kolderstova, 2011; MENA-OECD, 2010; and the Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance for
the Public Enterprise Sector 2006). The code is viewed as a complementary material to the
introduced legislation – the Egyptian Business Public Sector Law 203 of 19912- which is
considered an extensive coverage of the practices of corporate governance regarding the holding
companies and affiliate ones.

1

The Egyptian Institute of Directors (EIOD) was inaugurated in 2003 as an initiative to foster better governance. The Ministry of
Investment (MOI), in 2006, published a Code of Corporate Governance for the Public Enterprise Sector. Although The Egyptian
Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA, Egypt’s financial market supervisor) was legally obligated to replace EIOD since June
2011, (the jurisdiction of EIOD was transferred to EFSA ), the organization will continue working as expected on the issue of
governance in both the private and public sector.

2

This law covers only those corporations that were originally intended to be privatized under the previously
named Ministry of Public enterprises – Ministry of Investment now, not the whole state-owned sector.
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However, many of the principles and guidelines in these documents are, for the most part,
voluntary. In other words, unless the Code of Corporate Governance is specifically enshrined
within a law or regulation, the firm will not be required to meet the entirety of the standard, code,
or guideline (Johnson, 2007). The principles also lack clarity and enough details of what
constitutes board effectiveness and do not give a detailed description about which information to
disclose.
In Egypt, joint ventures form a significant and an increasing segment of SOEs. Therefore,
improving governance in joint ventures established between the state and private partners
deserves earnest regard. Firstly, this is because such ventures are very familiar in Egypt and
more commonly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The creation of new Joint
Venture companies with state participation is still common, even though relatively few new
SOEs are now being established in countries adopting market- based approaches (Bremer, 2012).
Secondly, public-private joint ventures encounter specific challenges vis–à–vis governance
issues that varies in significant respects from those of companies that are wholly state-owned or
wholly private. The state’s ownership goals may differ heavily from those of the private
investors. The two groups of owners may have very divergent opinions on such important
governance challenges as disclosure and transparency, risk appetite, as well as obligations to
both social and environmental criteria. Thirdly, such companies may in addition be prone to
complex and vague reporting regimes, partly due to their distinct groups of owners who must
abide by divergent regulatory restrictions along with reporting requirements which depends on
whether they are government agencies , listed companies, , state-owned enterprises, privatelyheld companies, other joint venture companies, or even individuals. Achieving Arm’s length
relations between the regulator and the regulated are unattainable if the government is on both
13

sides of the table. Moreover, as Oseichuk et al. (2009) view the board’s role, IJVs board of
directors are finding themselves considering a higher number of factors, for instance the lack of a
shared national environment, regulators associated with government, and community
organizations. Whereas those above issues often beset international joint ventures that are
affiliated wholly to the private sector, governmental joint venture partners are expected to
encounter further pressures from political considerations, competing goals among various
government shareholders, and nationalistic attitudes pertaining to some stakeholders (Bremer,
2012).
Surprisingly, in light of these considerations corporate governance for public-private JVs has not
gained the required attention (Bremer, 2012). This could be justified by the fact that the issue has
simply fallen between two stools; neglected by both mainstream analysts of corporate
governance as well as that handling public sector governance. The formation of such joint
ventures is very important in Egypt first because in the petroleum and petrochemical sector
which is rapidly developing , any foreign investments is required to be made through joint
ventures where the state holds a 50 percent ownership stake in any formed enterprise . Second,
joint ventures formed between Egyptian companies and the Egyptian government are considered
a crucial part of the publicly traded corporate sector.
Thence, IJVs differ from any other enterprise in the sense that the quality of their board decisions
is highly influenced by the openness existing among the board of directors as well as by the
willingness shown on their part to build consensus and come out with a shared vision for the
future. Child and Faulkner (1998) perceived that monitoring both internal and external
relationships in an IJV is considered an influential factor in the success of an IJV (Oseichuk et
al., 2009).Ergo good governance is no longer an option; it became an imperative. Firms are now
14

reconsidering and strengthening the structures of their governance from the boardroom to the
management level.
This study aims at examining the extent of differences in perceptions on the boards of oil and
gas joint ventures between international or domestic private firms and Egyptian state-owned
companies towards corporate governance practices.



Why this study aims to focus on the Petroleum Sector?

In developing nations with considerable oil and gas resources, the petroleum sector is an
important means of wealth and establishing a sustainable economy as well as positive and good
long-term human development. Producer governments’ and citizens’ concern over reliance on
volatile oil revenues has resulted in increasing the stakes, and also led to the rising of public
expectations (Lahn et al., 2007). The Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum oversees the petroleum
industry through its four holding companies, which act as the government’s agents for
supervision of supervise oil, gas, and petrochemical activities (AmCham BSAC, 2005).

The four holding companies -- The Egyptian General Petroleum Holding company (EGPC), the
Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS), The Egyptian Petrochemicals Holding
Company (ECHEM) and Ganoub El Wadi Petroleum Holding Company (GANOPE) -- are
companies entirely owned by state. In the swiftly growing petroleum and petrochemicals
Egyptian sector, all foreign investment must be done through joint ventures where the EGPC and
the contractor retains 50% of ownership (Model concession of agreement, 2013). The petroleum
sector deserves special consideration to guarantee good governance, not only due to the fact that
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investments tend to be huge but also because it is widely identified as being prone to specific
governance challenges.
The growing focus on petroleum sector governance and its performance in the economy is
attributed to the difficulties encountered in the attempt to manage oil revenues in an efficient and
equitable manner, pressure from continuous developing international standards as well as the
provisions of economic liberalization (Lahn et al., 2007). Amid the hard and tumultuous times
Egypt is experiencing, the Egyptian Petroleum Sector is suffering from significant debts owed to
foreign petroleum firms by the Egyptian Government (Egypt Oil & Gas, 2011). The debts
reached nearly over $4 billion which threatens to hinder oil and gas production stability.
Therefore more transparency and disclosure are needed –especially after a revolution sparked by
corruption.
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Chapter 2 : Statement of the problem
Despite the putative significance of the international joint venture board directors for the success
of IJV and the magnitude of research into various issues of IJV operations – for example,
reasons for the formation of IJVs, performance/instability, management of human resources,
control, trust, and relationship of inter-partners , governing joint ventures, organizational culture
/national culture, and impact of cultural diversity on management (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) –
no research could be identified, even after an extensive review of literature, that examined the
difference between the perception of state’s ownership board members and private ones in stateowned JVs towards the concept of corporate governance and their board effectiveness in Egypt.
It is very rare one can find any literature about the confusion among the different board
members regarding the way they perceive corporate governance and how effective their board
should be , and its consequences (Oseichuk et al., 2009). Consequently this might lead to the
formation of a failing board is characterized by arguments, disharmony and lack of effectiveness
and sometimes also accompanied by financial turmoil.
Research Questions:
This study investigates if there are differences in perceptions on the boards of joint
ventures between international or domestic private firms and Egyptian state-owned companies
using the oil and gas industry as a case study. The investigative questions are as follows:
 Whether there are differences among foreign, Egyptian private and Egyptian government
board members (and all Egyptian directors) in their assessment of the governance
practices of their boards in terms of the below issues?
o Board composition and director capabilities
17

 Board composition and diversity
 Specific industrial and functional expertise
 Current capabilities and their future development
o Director roles and accountabilities
 Roles and responsibilities of Board committees
 Board processes and protocols
o Delivery on roles of the Board
 Strategy
 Performance management
 Attitudes toward company performance issues
 Risk management
 Talent management
o Effective dynamics
 Preparation and participation
 Challenge and conflict
 Effective dynamics
o Overall Board effectiveness and renewal
 Board evaluation
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 Whether there are differences between Egypt and the GCC board findings?

 Most crucial levers in achieving board effectiveness;

 Time given to the board duties, tasks , and responsibilities;

 Existence of international expertise in the board rooms;

 Proportion of independent directors on the board;

 Utilization of board committees;

 Board meeting dynamics (i.e. the quality of information provided to the board,
and the level of board members’ preparation and participation in board meetings);

 The presence of a formalized process of evaluation.
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Chapter 3 : Literature Review
States Owned Enterprise and Governance:
This section provides an overview of SOEs governance including the principles set out for stateowned enterprises by OECD, the historical context of the establishment of state-owned
enterprises in the MENA region, then moves into SOEs governance in Egypt, legal framework
and regulatory environment in which SOEs are operating, Egyptian state-owned Joint Ventures
and finally a glimpse of the statutory legal, supervisory and regulatory framework for the oil and
gas sector in Egypt.
The misuse of natural monopolies, externalities, failure of capital market and equity issues are
the most frequently cited reasons for the raison d’etre of SOEs (Odainkey and Simpson, 2012).
SOEs contribute to the reduction of the unequal distribution of both economic inefficiencies as
well as surpluses along with the reduction of capital market. Kumar noted that after the 2008
worldwide financial crisis, SOEs role has become more important than before.
Growing calls have been made demanding public sectors in many developing countries to offer
quality public services that satisfy the needs of its citizens, be more accountable for the decisions
they make and actions they take as well as to manage resources in a more careful and wise
manner, while promoting private market-led growth (Odainkey and Simpson, 2012).These
growing calls have been made because of the public sectors’ primary role and its contribution to
the process of development, particularly in developing nations(Hemming and Mansoor,1988). As
a part of the public sector, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have noticeable impact on key
economic indicators including GDP, employment and others, particularly in the Middle East,
Africa, and Asia.
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State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) especially in developing countries have become the foremost
targets of numerous reforms in an effort to meet the demands of making them more accountable,
and hence guaranteeing their efficiency as well as their effectiveness in their performance and
operations (Odainkey and Simpson, 2012).The reforms that have been introduced to boost the
efficiency of SOEs in their utilization and allocation of resources can be categorized into
privatization, more competition and making administrative, political and institutional reforms.
This is due to the fact that SOEs, in developing economies, have been identified as one of the
major sponsors for socio-economic development, but often do not live up to the public’s
expectations or their market potential.
In spite of that, evidence on the SOEs performance, as Trivedi (2005) argues, has not been
promising due to the fact that SOEs have not yielded the results they are expected to render
particularly with regards to developing economies (Odainkey and Simpson, 2012). The poor
performance of SOEs has been attributed to several theoretical and empirical factors (Chang
2007). The World Bank’s Report (1989) pointed out to the fact that the poor performance of the
public sector and retarded growth is due to its over-extension which leads to the scarcity of
financial and human resources. This slower growth has chiefly sprung from the increased
involvement of SOEs in several industries and sectors of developing nations as in public utilities,
leading governments to be both financially and managerially over-stretched. Moreover, the
SOEs’ poor performance has pointed to governance issues along with financial propriety issues
beside others, regardless of ownership structure (Kumar, 2011).
Increasing evidence backs the opinion that there is a negative relationship between corruption
and, investment and economic growth in developing nations (Thomas, 2012). Corruption and
related corporate governance transgressions existing in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 21

previously thought to foster development in third-world nations – have become an international
phenomena. Nicholl (2006) expresses the view that, whereas the public sector is not basically
obliged to account for economic competitiveness, poor governance existing within this sector
unavoidably holds back this process of competitiveness. In spite of that, stakeholders’ reactions
to governance transgressions are starting to rally governments in favor of dealing with operations
done at SOEs for the purpose of transforming SOEs into organizations nurturing national
competitiveness (Crawford et al., 2003).
The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprises noticed unique
challenges pertaining to corporate governance encountered by SOEs. “On the one hand, they
may suffer from undue hands-on and politically motivated ownership which may result in an
uneven playing field and a loss of transparency. On the other hand, SOEs may also experience
situations where state ownership can be characterized as passive or distant” (MENA- OECD,
2010: 31) In those conditions, SOEs – especially if it is not a wholly owned- might experience
a “dilution of accountability” towards the government, shareholders, stakeholders and the public
(MENA- OECD, 2010: 31). Originally, corporate governance challenges stem from the fact that
accountability for SOEs performance comprises of an intricate chain of agents without clear
identifiable, known principals (MENA- OECD, 2010).
For more than a decade corporate governance (CG) has been a major policy topic in nations with
developed market economies (Muhamad, 2009).According to Hashim (2009), CG is a mixture of
processes and structures directed by the board of directors aiming at authorizing, directing, as
well as overseeing management for achieving the objectives of the organization. An increasing
recognition of the importance of effective CG in guaranteeing good quality of financial reports
has begun to appear in recent years. Effective CG ensures high, sound financial reporting, and
22

credible accounting which in turn leads to the transparency of information which enables users,
particularly shareholders and investors to make well-informed decisions. Rezaee (2005) indicates
that the board members are appointed to work as the eyes and ears of the shareholders to assure
the shareholder value creation. Mallin (2003), stroke a note that CG, in the last decade, has
managed to grow as well as develop significantly and that many countries have released CG
codes which includes recommendations that embody good CG, which without suspicion
contribute towards more transparency and disclosure. Yuan and Yuan (2007) proposed that CG
has a higher influence on enhancing business efficacy more than an internal control system.
Enhancing CG is a more effective method than increasing the strength of the internal control
system in deterring fraud and enhancing business efficiency.

Corporate governance principles and recommendations for state-owned enterprises:
The foundation of corporate governance is based on a system of ethical practices (Young and
Thyil, 2008) or on a group of relatively shared norms and values which are communicated and
negotiated (Fleming and McNamee, 2005). It is involved with norms of behavior and values
along with moral philosophy that direct a corporation’s behavior in a society (Francis and
Armstrong, 2003). Corporate governance links the relationships between the organization’s
management, its board of directors along with its stakeholder together by way of structuring
goals and their means of accomplishment as well as performance monitoring(OECD, 2004) in
ethically defensible manner (Fleming and McNamee, 2005).
A growing realization, during the past years, of the requirement for more accountability in the
public sector, has led to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
which plays a major role in creating guidelines relating to ethical practice in public
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organizations, mainly but not solely for OECD member countries (Thomas, 2012). The
Principles of Corporate Governance developed by OECD, published for the first time in 1999
have received worldwide acknowledgement as an ‘‘international benchmark’’ as well as a tool
for reference to indicate good corporate governance (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005, p. 127).
These shared principles are being acknowledged internationally as one of the 12 main pillars
aiming at achieving international financial stability. Subsequently, Principles intended for SOEs
but put in relation to the general principles, were advanced among the guidelines pertaining to
Corporate Governance of SOEs (OECD, 2005).

1.1 Principle: the Framework of corporate governance
This principle focuses on the requirement of a legal and regulatory framework within which
SOEs function to guarantee that market competition is there, so that any market distortions could
be avoided. Effective and sound governance should ensure that systems are developed so that to
manage to oversee the effectuality of this kind of governance framework (Howard and SeithPurdie, 2005).

1.2 Principle: key ownership functions
This principle pinpoints the style of management by government- as being the owner or key
shareholder of State-Owned Enterprises (Thomas, 2012). It also suggests that SOEs should
obtain operational autonomy so that their targets- as specified and overseen by governmentcould be accomplished. It is the government’s obligation to guarantee the establishment of
effective and transparent structure of governance to foster the SOEs long-term interests.
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Hence, Howard and Seith-Purdie (2005) emphasize the crucial nature of the designation of board
members to guarantee an effective level as well as mixture of skills. Van der Walt et al. (2006)
suggest that the composition of the board is determined by the organization’s stage of life, the
established strategic environment, the ownership structures’ nature as well as the requirements
set for both governance and performance.
1.3 Principle: Equal treatment of shareholders
This Principle advocates the rights pertaining to shareholders; their treatment in an equitable
manner and their ability to have an equal access to corporate information (Thomas, 2012). It also
proposes transparency towards shareholders as well as establishing active communication along
with offering consultation with them. The principle promotes the participation of shareholders
that constitute a minority. Lu et al. (2009) noticed that getting an equitable treatment should
encourage the shareholders’ participation in critical decisions as well as it should ease the
process of posing questions during meetings, ensuring their right to obtain timely relevant
information that could have an effect on the decision-making process.
1.4 Principle: Stakeholders’ role in the organization
Stakeholders are a broader group than that of shareholders (Thomas, 2012). They should be
given attention by SOEs for having a legitimate concern in firm’s business. Ferrell (2004)
defines a stakeholder as being an individual or some identifiable group upon which the
organization’s continued survival is determined. According to Clarkson (1995), primary
stakeholder grouping is comprised of customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, and
investors. Governments and communities are also categorized as public stakeholders who offer
infrastructure and markets, where obedience of its laws and regulations are obligatory, and where
one has to comply with its duties and obligations. Werther and Chandler (2004) noticed the
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strong association between an organization and its stakeholders and the influence of causing
damage to these relationships on the organization’s survival. SOEs, in this way, are urged to
frequently give an account of their stakeholder relationships as well as to create an internal code
of ethics that consider the rights of stakeholders. Lu et al. (2009) emphasize the significance of
disclosing matters. This could have an impact on stakeholders like for example: incentive
schemes, employee benefits, and the way environmental issues are tackled.
1.5 Principle: disclosure and transparency issue
This Principle addresses matters as for example: the need for frequent annual reporting, good
accounting and auditing criteria, disclosing fully the risk factors, and an annual separate outside
audit (Thomas, 2012).
1.6 Principle: Duties of the board members
The primary responsibilities of the board of directors are outlined involving accountability to
government including the annual appraisal pertaining its functioning, equitable treatment of all
shareholders, management oversight, objectivity, impartiality, and independence of judgment,
attaining of unbiased and just information, the authority to designate and expel the CEO, and the
formation of specialized committees to aid the board in its task (Thomas, 2012). Much the same
principles formulated by the USA-based National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD,
2009) also stress the principal role that the board has in monitoring as well as in accountability,
involving guaranteeing that the selected board of directors are proficient and dedicated as shown
in both the time they committed themselves to the organization along with their dynamic
attention to the task they are having at hand. These principles of the NACD (2009) emphasize
the necessity for independent, impartial, and nonpartisan board leadership that demonstrates
integrity, ethics, moral rectitude and reliability all of which inculcates the spirit of the corporate
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culture. In this way the effectiveness and impartiality of a board can be indicated by simply
noting how many of the members are not rooting for any ideological party and the need for
spiritual independence of spirit and structural independence. In the debate about corporate
governance, the role played by the board of directors has been subjected to scrutiny in such
domains like the board composition, the board size, internal control, internal audit, risk
management, and leadership. Nonetheless, it is usually the more small (but important) and less
measurable constituents within the culture of the board of directors that affect the success of the
board (Thomas, 2012). Such subjects lay particular stress on for example board integrity,
recognizing each and every member’s contribution, opening channels of communication as well
as promoting constructive and productive debate. Concerning the above mentioned point, Dalton
and Dalton (2006) perceived that paying whatever amount of attention to effective and
efficiently process wasn’t enough to deal with directors who are elected and are behaving with
less, integrity, rectitude, honor, and honesty along with paying less respect for other members.

The bottom line, according to McLellan (2009),is that sound corporate governance pertaining to
SOEs should involve more appreciation of the relationship existing between governance,
compliance and organizational culture, forming adequate structures to foster good governance,
possessing the knowledge of when to employ teams and hierarchies as well as committees, being
cognizant of and capable of managing conflicts of interest, handling the various stakeholders’
expectations along with implementing and overseeing the organization’s values.

The origins of state-owned sectors in the region:
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Historically speaking, MENA countries’ governments have been administrating, controlling,
planning, and organizing most activities through public institutions (Dawley et al., 2008). As for
the Arab countries, according to Younis (1996), politics and history as well as law and
psychology have played a role in producing a restricted process of privatization. This mixture of
dominance of state and socioeconomic factors has formed the structures of the whole economy
To fully understand the context in which SOEs function, the role of public sector and the
challenges it faces, a brief overview of the main political economy factors that lead to the
emergence of the state as the owner of commercial enterprises in the countries of MENA should
be discussed (Akoum, 2012 and OECD, 2012).
Until the 1950s, most of the region was under colonial rule. Some did not even obtain their
independence until 1970s (Younis, 1996). As a result of the attainment of independence and the
enjoyment of a considerable degree of political sovereignty, discussions and development
concerns took place accompanied with a higher degree of open hostility towards colonial powers
which was shown in the refusal of any political patronage of colonialists as well as their
economic doctrines though they represented only an economic face of colonialism.

Another repercussion of obtaining independence is that most of the region countries have
embraced socialism along with a slightly different model of development based on substantial
state intervention in economic activities, self- sufficiency, protectionism, and import substitution
(Akoum, 2012, and OECD, 2012). A deluge of nationalization has sprung up, recapturing some
of the assets to state ownership. Most remarkable examples were the nationalization of Suez
Canal in 1956 in Egypt and also the nationalization of the oil sector in 1951 in Iran (Akoum,
2012).
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This development model’s legacy over the years has formed the state ownership’s structure and
objectives in the region imposing choices about the frameworks and practices of governance
(OECD, 2012). In Egypt, SOEs were set up across a group of strategic and non-strategic
industries. The evolution of SOEs has had a considerable influence on the whole economies of
the region. The SOE’s impact socio-economy has not waned at all, in spite of the continuous
zealous privatization programmes in some countries that have begun more than 20 years. SOEs
have functioned and still function as the prime providers and suppliers of fiscal revenue, cheap
pubic goods and services (from food to military equipment), and last but not least employment.
The announcement of the intent of undergoing privatization program has caused a great outrage
reflected in labour strikes and protests due to the common perception among Egyptians that
privatization automatically means layoffs (OECD, 2012).
Now the concerns of the policy makers in the region countries are directly aiming at optimising
the portfolio of their ownership, improving SOEs standards of governance, setting up public
private joint venture companies, and definitely boosting the performance of the public sector to
be in line with the private one sector (OECD, 2012).

SOEs governance in Egypt:
A significant rise in awareness of corporate governance and its advantages has been witnessed in
Egypt, despite the fact that the concept of corporate governance – known as Hawkamah in
Arabic- was not known in MENA and Egypt until the 1990s.These reforms and initiatives
incorporate the inception of the Egyptian Institute of Directors under the umbrella of the
Ministry of Investment and introduction of two corporate governance codes: the Egyptian Code
of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in 2005 and the Code of Corporate Governance
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for State-Owned Enterprises in 2006(MENA – OECD, 2010).The principles of the two codes are
rooted in the OECD guidelines mentioned above.

Legal framework and regulatory environment in which SOEs are operating:
In most jurisdictions, there are differences between state-owned and private enterprises. These
differences emanate from various elements as level of government control, legal form, etc. The
issuance of the Egyptian Code of Corporate Governance for the Public Enterprise Sector in July
2006 was a step of specific significance. The code is considered the first of its kind in the MENA
region. Its basis is found in the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned
Enterprises. It has been formed with the OECD experts input. The code, which clearly takes the
perspective of the state as an owner, defines corporate governance in a broad way as follows “a
set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its shareholders and other
stakeholders”(MENA – OECD, 2010: 10).
Egypt has developed a legislation that sets out the requirements of corporate governance for
SOEs in an attempt to shape ownership structure as well as practices of governance. The Public
Business Sector Law 203 of 1991 is an example. The purpose of the law is to set out the
governance frameworks concerning SOEs as well as the stakes owned by the Egyptian
government in JVs- placed for sale under The AMP3. The law is not applicable to all SOEs;
exempted from it a number of corporations (that are not monitored by the Ministry of
Investment) and those4corporations are considered of strategic interest overseen by line

3

Asset Management Programme created by the Ministry Of Investment in 1993 marking the beginning of
Privatization in Egypt.
4
Actually MOI only has jurisdiction over the holding companies and the companies that were originally slated for
privatization (and put under the holding companies). In theory it has jurisdiction over state-owned enterprises,
but, as I understand it, it is entirely dependent on the companies and the ministries to send in information and,
basically, they don’t. 1991 is the privatization law and established the Ministry of Investment, earlier called the
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ministries in sectors of military, banking, water, telecom, production, etc...(MENA – OECD,
2010; and Amico, 2012).
The law deals with several major corporate governance practices such as: the constitution of
the board, requirements for quorum, participation of stakeholder, the composition of the general
assembly, and requirements of board members’ selection (Amico, 2012). The reform of 1991,
which intended to reform the structure of ownership, was originally created to provide a support
to the privatization program, and therefore encompassed only those firms intended to be included
in this effort under the aegis of Ministry of Investment.
As the legislative framework has been evolving5, so do too the voluntary corporate governance
practices for SOEs (Amico, 2012). The legal framework is now supplemented with a code or
guidelines of corporate governance for SOEs which cover issues that include appointment of
board members, responsibilities and duties of the board, requirements for disclosure, and
handling of stakeholders.
In order to understand the context in which state joint ventures in Egypt operate, there is a need
to grasp the regulatory context affecting these firms. A major impediment to the effectual
monitoring of governmental ownership in the Egyptian joint ventures as well as evaluating the
quality of such monitoring, is that there is no consolidated report on state-owned joint ventures
or even the state-owned enterprise sector in general (Bremer, 2012; and MENA – OECD, 2010).
The composition and exact size of the whole Egyptian SOE sector are unknown which hinders
ministry of public enterprise, but renamed in the reorganization undertaken by Mohie-eddin and Boutros Ghali.
(Personal communication with Dr. Bremer).
The MOI website at one point had a listing of companies with their underlying law according to Bremer (personal
communication), but now this website is not working.
5

For a clear picture of the Laws governing Public Sector and Holding Companies see Gohneim in Appendix 1.
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any effective examination of the sector and its constituencies’ governance as well as their
performance (Bremer, 2012). Hence, no effort was made to form a consolidated report of
governmental ownership stakes, particularly for the strategic entities overseen by the Military or
Ministry of Petroleum or corporations of strategic interests like water, banks, and telecom were
set aside (Bremer, 2012; and MENA – OECD, 2010). This difficulty in obtaining the relevant
consolidated data and information on the Egyptian SOEs mirrors the lack of a distinct
government entity having the authority to monitor the whole SOEs sector including state-owned
joint ventures as well as indicating that there is no streamlined structure for SOEs’ corporate
governance arrangements and general monitoring (Bremer, 2012).
In Egypt, There are two prime categories of laws that govern the legal framework dealing with
the concept of corporate governance (Dahawy, 2008). Those are the laws which govern
companies and also listed companies in the Cairo Alexandria Stock Exchange (CASE). The laws
governing the companies’ incorporation in Egypt are as follows: Companies’ Law (CL
159/1981), Investment Law (IL 8/1997), and Public Business Sector Law (PBLS 203/1991).
The Companies ‘Law is the one regulating joint stock and limited liability companies, and
partnerships limited by shares. As for the Investment, it offers some facilities in some specific
economic and industrial sectors by providing tax free zones and exemption from certain income
tax (Dahawy, 2008). The Public Business Sector Law governs the incorporation of companies in
the public business sector and lays out also the governance framework for SOEs (Bremer, 2012;
and Dahawy, 2008).It differentiates between the public sector and the public business sector.
The law sets the regulations upon which the relationship between the Holding Companies and
their affiliated firms is determined. For example the law includes the nomination of the General
Assembly (GA) of each holding company by the prime minister – This GA is headed by the
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responsible minister, the nomination of the board of directors of the Holding Companies being
done by the Prime Minister is based on the relevant minister recommendations6 (Gamal, 2010).
The Holding companies’ board of directors is the general assembly of all its subsidiaries or
affiliated companies and half of the board of directors of the affiliated companies is selected by
the holding company board of directors- The GA (Gamal, 2010). Since law 203, which governs
state-owned enterprises, is short of the detailed requirements for corporate governance, the
Egyptian Government saw the dire need to introduce a code of corporate governance to cover
those missing details in the law, such as the overall framework, transparency and disclosure of
information, relationship between the board and management, the rights of stakeholders, the
objectives of ownership and, internal control environment (Gamal, 2010).
The law also set the legal foundation for privatization by moving 314 public companies from
government ministries’ authority and regrouping them as subsidiaries overseen by sixteen public
holdings (Egypt Business Law Handbook, 2009).
As for subsidiary companies, they are incorporated under Law no. 203/1991, and law no.
159/1981 (Ghoneim, 2005). Their legal status is that of Joint Stock Companies. Holding
companies7 are the one who supervises them and it should own more than at least 50% of its
capital. As for Holding companies, they are subject to the following laws: Law no. 203/1991,
and law no. 159/1981 and are considered as joint stock companies. As for the ownership, the
holding companies’ capital is fully owned by the state or public judicial persons (Ghoneim,
2005). As for the JVs, its stakes are owned by the government and have been sold to foreign
investors (MENA – OECD, 2010) where the state owns 50%.
6

if the holding companies own the 203 companies, then there is a need to have an independent board along with
separate board and general assembly bodies (Bremer personal communication)
7
This sector is not transparent and very little information is available on how it is structured.
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State-owned Joint Ventures:
There has been a persistent expansion in the sector of joint ventures over the past 20 years.
Entities of the state have entered into new partnerships with foreign as well as domestic partners
(Bremer, 2012).The Ministry of Investment developed a consolidated listing for only the
corporations it oversees as of 2009. This is because of the sharp decline happened since the
revolution 2011 in all kinds of regulatory compliance inside government. The database
belonging to the Asset Management Program– created by the Ministry of Investment - before its
termination in October 2011 contained 662 JVs. Out of these 662 JVs, 386 were wholly or
partially owned by one of the nine holding companies overseen by the Ministry of Investment.
At the same time the holding companies under the aegis of the Ministry of Investment do not
necessarily include all the public-private JVs in their sector. In addition, 276 JVs were listed as
being partially owned by other Ministries and entities. Some of these companies’ shares are
owned by one or more public sector companies or other entities within the public sector. Public
sector banks and insurance companies represent the largest shares in these non-holding
companies8 (Bremer, 2012).
Not only does the database of the Ministry of Investment not include all joint ventures, but the
nine holding companies under the aegis of the Ministry of Investment are not the only Egyptian
public sector holding companies (Bremer, 2012);here are five holding companies: The Egyptian
Petrochemicals Holding Company (ECHEM) , The Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company
(EGAS), Ganoub El-Wadi Petroleum Holding Company (GANOPE), The Egyptian General

8

This actually came from Bremer’s analysis of the data coming from the MOI website concerning holding
companies and their subsidiaries.
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Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), and The Egyptian Mineral Resources Authority (EMRA)overseen by the Ministry of Petroleum. Those holding companies own extremely large portfolios
of public shares in petroleum joint ventures, though they are not disclosed publicly. “The
ownership structure within the government can be equally complex. It may include ministries,
public sector firms (including government-owned or JV banks), intergovernmental organizations
(jointly owned by multiple Arab governments) and other stakeholders such as unions… some,
but not all, of these ownership shares may be reflected in board positions” (Bremer, 2012: 119).

A brief overview of the statutory legal, supervisory and regulatory framework for the oil
and gas sector in Egypt:
The key laws governing the petroleum sector include: Law No. 66 for 1953 or what is known as
the Fuel Raw Materials Law pertaining to the fuel raw materials, Law No. 217 of 1980
pertaining to Natural Gas, Law No. 61 of 1958 pertaining to the incentives being granted to
investments concerning natural resources, and Law No. 86 of 1956 relating to quarrying and
mining (Egypt Oil and Gas, 2013). As for the laws governing state-owned oil and gas joint
ventures, they are as follow: Law no. 89 of 1960 regulating the granting of residence to the
expatriate personnel of the operating company and the employees appointed by the contractors,
and Law no. 4 of 1994 promulgating the law concerning the environment.
EGPC was created under Law no. 20 of 1976 (Model of concession agreement, 2013), while
EGAS, ECHEM, and GANOPE were established in accordance with Law no. 203/1991 (Egypt
Oil and Gas, 2013). As for EMRA, it is established under Law No. 86 of 1956. ECHEM is
established according Law no. 159 for 1981 Business Public Companies Law (public sector
companies) for joint stock firms, limited partnerships as well as limited liability companies
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(Ministry of Investment website) and Law no. 95 for 1992 Capital Markets Law (Ministry of
Petroleum website).
As for the holdings companies of Petroleum Sector9 , EGAS has 39 subsidiaries or affiliated
companies. As for ECHEM, there are 8 companies and 12 belong to GANOPE (Egypt Oil and
Gas companies’ directory)10. There are also four types of Oil and Gas companies’
establishments: 12 Oil and GAS Public sector petroleum companies (12 companies), state-owned
Oil and GAS joint ventures (41), 106 investment companies (106) and Petroleum multinational
companies (67). 11
In Egypt until 2004, the major government agencies involved in the upstream oil and gas sector
are the Ministry of Petroleum, the EGPC, and the Parliament (Egypt Oil and Gas, 2013). The
Ministry of Petroleum is in charge of formulating policies, preparing rules and guidelines, along
with controlling, coordinating, and monitoring the activities of the oil and gas sector. As for
EGPC, it is in effect a government agency overseen by the Ministry of Petroleum according to
the law establishing it. According to the law governing EGPC, it is in charge for the whole oil
and gas sector’s activities from exploration, production, and transportation through refining12.

And this restructuring included separating the activities of natural gas and petrochemical
activities from those activities performed by EGPC as well as establish a single agency focused
on Upper Egypt (Egypt Oil and Gas, 2013). In 2004, EGAS (Egyptian Natural Gas), ECHEM
(The Egyptian Petrochemicals Holding Company), GANOPE (Ganoub El-Wadi Petroleum
9

See Appendix 2.
It is noticed that there are discrepancies regarding the number and names of the affiliated companies between
the Ministry of Petroleum’s directory existing on their website and its hard copy directory.
11
See Appendix 3.
12
Although GANOPE and ECHEM are also in this (the latter only in processing).
10
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Holding Company), and EMRA (Egyptian General Authority for Mineral Resources) were
founded by the government where EGAS became responsible for the natural gas activities,
GANOPE became in charge for managing and overseeing all petroleum activities south of
latitude 2813 – known as Upper Egypt, ECHEM is responsible for petrochemical activities, and
EMRA is in charge for assessing, planning, and developing the mineral resources (including
petroleum and gas). The restructuring process also included the transferring of 14 petroleum
concessions from EGPC to EGAS. EGAS is now in charge for awarding concessions concerning
the exploration of non-associated natural gas in the Delta, Mediterranean Sea, as well as in some
small parts of North Sinai and Red Sea. As for EGPC, it is responsible for awarding concessions
in the remaining parts of Red Sea and Western Desert. But since there is no law issued to clarify
these geographic divisions, a scope of conflict developed and continues between the EGPC and
EGAS jurisdictions. Moreover, in theory, since no legislative amendment has been made to
EGPS’s mandate, the jurisdiction of EGPC still remains all over the activities concerning
petroleum in Egypt.

The right for exploration and production of oil and gas is granted by the Ministry of Petroleum
according to the Egyptian Law No.86 for 1959, taking the shape of a concession agreement held
between the contractor (i.e. the bidding firm succeeded in obtaining the concession) and the
Egyptian state -represented by the Ministry of Petroleum and EGPC or EGAS as relevant(Model of concession agreement, 2013). The parliament enacted a law allowing the Petroleum
Minister to conclude the Concession Agreement between the Egyptian state on one side , and
EGPC – the concession holder- and the foreign oil company (i.e. the contractor) on the opposite
side, granting the right to produce and explore oil and gas in a particular zone and according to
13

Beni Suef, El Fayoum, El Menia, Assiut, Sohag ,Qena ,Luxor And Aswan (GANOPE website).
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the stipulations set in the law as well as the rules, procedures “that have the force of Law and
prevail over other Egyptian Legislation including the above mentioned Law No. 66 for 1953 as
amended” (Model of concession agreement, 2013: 9 ).
The agency that leads the negotiations of the concession agreement is either EGPC or EGAS, as
applicable (Model of concession agreement, 2013). Then after negotiation takes place, this
agreement will be referred to the concerned Minister – the Petroleum Minister- for approval.
Once the approval of the Minister is obtained, the agreement is submitted to the People’s
Assembly where the Energy Committee makes a report and then a vote is held by members of
parliament on promulgating of the concession agreement as a law.
EGPC or EGAS, as applicable, then announce and administer the petroleum bidding rounds
(Egypt Oil and Gas, 2013). The bidders are evaluated and selected first according to their
technical qualifications and financial abilities and then are assessed on the commercial terms of
their bids. Model forms of the concession agreement for both EGPC and EGAS are used, “which
are the basis for negotiations. The Model Agreements are produced by the State Council and are
subject to periodic revisions. Under the Model Agreements, the parties agree an initial
exploration period and the number and period of any extensions to such initial exploration
period. Typically, the initial exploration period is two and a half years, starting from the effective
date of the concession agreement. The contractor may be granted two successive extensions of
three years and two years respectively” (Egypt Oil and Gas, 2013: 2).
In the development phase, EGPC or EGAS, as relevant, and the foreign oil investor will establish
an operating company in Egypt governed by the Egyptian law where it will be 50% - 50%of the
shares of the newly established company. Each party has the right to designate four board
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members to its board and replace them at any time. The chairman appointed by EGPC is also the
managing director. As for the contractor, the foreign oil investor nominates the General Manager
who will be at the same time another managing director on the same board as the Concession
Agreement for Petroleum Exploration and Exploitation stipulates:
“Operating Company shall have a Board of Directors consisting of eight (8) members, four (4) of
whom shall be designated by EGPC and the other four (4) by CONTRACTOR. The Chairman
shall be designated by EGPC and shall also be a Managing Director. CONTRACTOR shall
designate the General Manager who shall also be a Managing Director.” (Article VIII: 81)
According also to the Model form of the concession agreement published on the Ministry of
Petroleum website, “ the operating Company and contractor shall, for the purpose of this
Agreement, be exempted from the following laws and regulations as now or hereafter amended
or substituted:
 Law No. 48 of 1978, on the employee regulations of public sector companies;
 Law No. 159 of 1981, promulgating the law on joint stock companies, partnership
limited by shares and limited liability companies;
 Law No. 97 of 1983 promulgating the law concerning public sector organizations and
companies;
 Law No. 203 of 1991 promulgating the law on public business sector companies; and
 Provisions of part 2 of Chapter 6 of Law No. 88 of 2003, organizing dealings in foreign
currencies.”(Model of Concession Agreement, 2013: 27)
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Finally, it is remarkable that very scant information is to be found on this sector of SOEs in
Egypt, as well as the Egyptian holding companies along with its subsidiaries and if
information was to be found, it is usually confusing, and tangled especially when it comes to
the regulatory laws and statutory structure that the sector abide by. This is considered an
issue that puts the status of transparency in question.

Board Effectiveness and Governance:
This section of the literature review on board effectiveness and corporate governance in IJVs
(IJVs, hereafter) will be categorized into two sections: Board effectiveness and Governance, and
Disagreements and Conflicts in IJVs Boards. The first section looks into the relationship between
corporate governance and board effectiveness and highlights the problems and conflicts
occurring in an IJV related to the governance structure, contractual agreement, and division of
ownership and control. As for the second section, it will look into the criteria of having an
effective board of directors and the board processes as well as the reasons leading to potential
conflicts and the types of conflicts which adversely affect board effectiveness and IJVs
performance in general.
The IJVs’ contemporaneous popularity and the discontent with their performance resulted in a
literature which indicates that IJV board directors can play a critical role in IJV success (Petrovic
et al., 2009). In theory, the board of directors is the one responsible for formulating long-term
corporate strategy. It is the one that assigns those who are fit to carry it out, and oversees the
performance and outcome against the strategy being put. Therefore , a failed performance and a
bad governance always starts with a board of directors not achieving its duties , tasks and
responsibilities towards the organization it serves (OECD, 2011). Shenkar and Zeira (1987)
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defined an IJV as "a separate legal organizational entity representing the partial holdings of two
or more parent firms, in which the headquarters of at least one parent firm is located outside the
country of operation of the joint venture. This entity is subject to the joint control of its parent
firms, each of which is economically and legally independent of the other"(Shenkar and Zeira,
1987: 56). This involves two or more companies determining the strategic direction and
operational matters of the JV Company (Petrovic et al., 2009).
IJV has a distinctive, “fragile” structure of governance – incomplete contracting and shared
sovereignty (Pearce, 1997:198). It is considered a quasi- hierarchy in terms of the shared
ownership and the existence of a contractual agreement which specifies what will be the nature
of this sharing. The uniqueness of JV governance form originally emanates from the creation of a
contractual agreement so that to determine the frame of the administration of the joint
sovereignty. The JV governance structure represents a great burden in terms of the bargaining
costs due to the presence of parental differences which could have a negative effect on the firm
performance as well as its survival. This makes it less efficient and fragile. The term bargaining
means that a group of activities, which attend the process of the completion and execution of the
agreement, indicates that the contractual agreement that establishes the company is incomplete.
This is because, the contract is not either addressing the issues it should tackle or the issues are
not fully covered. At least four important issues should be tackled in the JV contracts to define
the nature of the relationship between the parties. The First issue is the extent and nature of risks
that are accepted or imposed. The second one is the specification of outcomes and how the
rewards would be distributed. The third one is the asset or resource commitment of each party.
The last one is what are the procedures and systems that determine the allocation of
responsibilities and duties, control, and authority.
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However, the determination of a mutual agreement on the terms and conditions tackling the
above areas mentioned in the JV contract will result in different degrees of uncertainty faced by
the JV parents due to an absence of trust and differences in objectives and goals. According to
Bremer (personal communication), though the IJV partners may divide the management roles in
the IJV reflecting their respective competencies and comparative advantage relative to the other
partner. For example, in oil and gas IJVs here (Egypt), the local partner is usually given the
operating role. In Chinese JVs, the local partner may be given the manufacturing role while the
international partner is expected to be more involved in international marketing. In both cases,
the inability to control key operational functions may increase risk for the foreign partner (from
inefficiency, less control over pollution, poor quality, reduced ability to control fraud by the local
partner, etc.).There is frequently a divergence of interests between parent companies in respect to
their IJV, which may demonstrate a “mixed motive scenario” encompassing both co-operation
and competition (Pearce, 1997: 198). This can easily cause conflicts between partners over
priorities and a temptation to act in opportunistic ways, that is, to obtain benefits from the
alliance, beyond the extent reciprocally agreed upon, in areas where the IJV contract is
incomplete. This adversely affects the performance of IJV.

Thence, any successful IJV operation inherently relies on the establishment of a proper
governance structure reflecting the partners’ respective equity share as well as management
control. The board then articulates the IJV partners’ collective goals or, as noted earlier, some
combination of shared and differentiated goals (Lee et al., 2003). The IJV governance structure
emerges as a contingent result of bilateral negotiations between prospective partners who have
imported various sets of resources to the joint venture. Therefore, the ownership and eventual
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distribution of control will result in part from the relative bargaining power and capacity owned
by the prospective participants, who may come from distinct cultural environments and also
different institutional backgrounds as well as differing with respect to the needs of their
businesses themselves, practice in the home countries, or other factors.
It also could result in conflicting control expectations between the partners that can result in
tensions and stress on the IJV board. For instance, the levels of parental satisfaction may or may
not concur with standard accounting measures. In other words, , a JV may be seen as being
unsuccessful by one or more of the partners despite achieving positive financial outcomes,
simply because the IJV did not live up to the partner’s expectations (Mohr, 2002). For instance, a
German GM on the board of a German-Chinese Joint Venture was interviewed and questioned
about the performance of the JV which he represents, he replied as follows :” I usually
distinguish between two issues: success can be seen as strategic or financial. Regarding the
strategic success, I have to say that we have surpassed our initial expectation very quickly:
market share, purchasing, and sales... in those areas we have made more progress than we
originally had hoped for. In financial terms, though, we have not met our objectives” (Mohr,
2002: 5).
Because Each of the parent firms has its unique mode of operation, structure, and objectives as
the two of the parent companies are at least anchored in dissimilar national and cultural
surroundings and each group of employees (expatriates of parent country or host country,
transferees of parent country or host country, host country nationals, or third country nationals)
has its own characteristics and qualities which stems from its nationality, work place , entity of
recruitment, position in the IJV hierarchy, legal rights and promotion possibilities, and
sometimes (often) pay and benefits.
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The nature of the conflict is not conducive for success according to (Bogun, 2008). For instance,
conflicts are more likely leading to lower satisfaction levels within the group- work groups and
management teams- and to less desire to stay in the group. As a result “frustration,
unpleasantness and dissatisfaction is likely to contribute to managers losing interest in, or in
extreme cases even terminating, their IJVs” (Bogun, 2008: 2). Interviews carried out by the
authors suggest that even little amounts of conflict can be destructive and fatal for human
interactions and the performance of the IJV and thus have to be averted. Following are several
quotations from the interviews conducted: “When conflict exists between parent firms in a joint
venture, the joint venture has little possibility of reaching its top possible performance” (Bogun,
2008: 2); “In fact, I have found that conflicts that directly involve the joint venture are the most
detrimental” (2000:148); “conflict is something like a cancer” (Bogun, 2008: 2).
Disagreements and Conflicts in IJVs Boards:
The section aims to shed light on the conflicts influencing board effectiveness and their
implications on the operations of JVs.
In contemporary management, the issue of JVs conflicts and their reduction along with their
elimination are considered a significant area of research. Several research outcomes regularly
stress that there are differences existing between the perceptions of partners coming from
developed countries and those coming from developing ones, as well as the differences exist also
between private partners and public ones (Jamali, 2004).
In order to identify the different factors causing conflict, it is necessary to put into consideration
the most common and pernicious conflicts affecting negatively the performance of IJVs and
they are as follow: values, styles of management, functional area: knowledge and skills, and
effort norms.
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Criteria of Board Effectiveness:
Board effectiveness is highly reliant on socio-psychological processes, especially those relating
to group participation, intercommunication, exchange of information, and discussions (Oseichuk
et al., 2009).
Board effectiveness is judged by two criteria: Board task performance and Board cohesiveness.
Board task performance is described as the capability of the board of directors to fulfill its
control and service tasks in an effective way (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). In order to accomplish
the control task, particular activities should be fulfilled, such as giving approval regarding key
initiatives suggested by the management, making decisions about compensations, hiring, and
replacing the most senior managers of the company. As for the service task, it includes activities
like offering expertise and insight when crucial situations demand them, like during restructuring
of the organization or an acquisition. Service task includes also informal and ongoing tasks; for
example: coming up with strategic options and alternatives during meetings of the board.
As for the board cohesiveness, it is the ability of the board members to stay on the board and
continue working with each other (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). While board task performance
directly affects company’s performance, cohesiveness has an indirect impact on the
organization’s performance affecting the current and future levels of board task performance. In
turn, the board members’ ability to keep working together, as demonstrated by board
cohesiveness, is in part affected by board members’ degree of attraction to each other. Moreover,
the work groups’ literature suggests that when members of a group are more attracted to one
another, they tend to achieve higher levels of satisfaction as well as higher levels of commitment
to the group (Petrovic et al., 2009). Hence, it leads to an atmosphere of trust, as Williams
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&O’Reilly (1998) explain, which spread among Board members a willingness to trust in each
other’s judgment and expertise, whereas boards with very low levels of interpersonal attraction
and cohesiveness cannot sustain such trust. Moreover, in some ways, it is found that
cohesiveness improves decision making process through encouraging earlier discussions of
alternative scenarios. It also improves decision making process by enhancing more
comprehensive discussion of alterative options and scenarios.
Board Processes and their Influences on the Effectiveness of the Board:
There are several processes that are more likely to affect both the board’s task performance and
its cohesiveness: Differences in values (Bogun, 2008), differences in management style,
functional area knowledge and skills, effort, norms, and language barrier (Forbes & Milliken,
1999).

Categorization of the reasons leading to conflicts in JV:
Values:
The major reason for conflicts may be incongruities in values, which Hofstede et al. (1990) argue
adopted by individuals: “The core of culture is formed by values, in the sense of broad,
nonspecific feelings of good and evil, beautiful and ugly, normal and abnormal, rational and
irrational - feelings that are often unconscious and rarely discussible, that cannot be observed as
such but are manifested in alternatives of behavior” (1990: 291).
Dissimilar values may lead to stress and negative feelings. Whereas Hennart & Zeng directed
their attention to values on the organizational level “a firm’s values are largely a reflection of its
national culture, and JV parents based in different countries will tend to have different values”
(2002: 700). Values are defined as “the individual’s personal preference in work-and life-related
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issues” (Hofstede et al., 1993: 490); they are linked to different and various concepts, that
involves objectives, solving problems, resolving conflict (Hennart & Zeng, 2002), a desire for
security, work centrality, a desire for authority (Hofstede et al., 1990) and, informal relationships
and oral agreements that are a fundamental constituent of trust (George et al., 1998).
Different styles of management:
Bogun (2008) argued that differences in IJV partners’ management style can lead to
contradictions and differences resulting in conflicts (Bogun, 2008). Managers who are from
different countries differ widely regarding their conception of what constitutes effective and
efficient managerial practices. It is found that differences in French-German IJVs’ managerial
style resulted in conflicts in three major phases: start-up, maturity and end. It also has its adverse
effect on functional area, managerial practices, and meeting deadlines. It is found that applying a
clear style of management to suit a given environment cause higher economic productivity.
It is also discovered that whereas Hungarian managers were more authoritarian and had more
powerful and potent roles, German managers confer autonomy on their inferiors. They were
more team-oriented; including others in the decision-making process.
Differences in functional area: knowledge and skills
Diversity in functional area: knowledge and skills leads to conflicts that occur on two levels:
Organizational level and individual one.
 Conflicts happening on an organizational level:
The board of directors is required to demonstrate a higher level of specialized knowledge and
skills in order to ensure its performance effectiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Functional area
knowledge and skills cover the traditional fields of business, such as strategic and operational
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management, production, finance, marketing and accounting, along with those fields that relate
to the company’s association with its environment, such as law. According to Ancona &
Caldwell (1988), the board of directors is identified as strategic-issue-processing and elite
groups14 and hence, its members must have knowledge and skills in such domains or have access
to outside networks which can help in gathering information and solving problems.
According to Gupta, & Govindarajan (2000), countries exhibiting advanced economic
development level are more liable to be the sources of managerial and marketing, technological
know-how than less developed countries. For example, Danis, & Parkhe (2002) noticed that
Hungarian managers did not possess written strategy and marketing knowledge in HungarianWestern partnerships, and had a narrow understanding of their mission. U.S. and Chinese
partners have different priorities in administrating and supervising IJV operations (Ding, 1997).
It is found that substantial differences in strategic targets between IJV partners of U.S. and China
exist (Bogun, 2008). Whereas the U.S. partners devoted their attention to entering the local
market and gaining profit in China, the Chinese partners sought to upgrade and enhance
technology and management. The Chinese managers and workers also were resistant to carry out
company policies on budgets, duties, and performance evaluation meetings.
 Conflicts happening on an individual level: Language Barrier and its implications:
Language barriers could moreover lead to more conflicts (Bogun, 2008). For instance, Bogun
(2008) noticed that American and Polish managers devoted time to looking at various words that
are missing in Polish language and attempting to think of a combination of words that are
understandable in Polish and have a meaning close to the English. In the Russian-Swedish

14

They are at the apex of the firm making high- level decisions; not involved in the implementation process and
producing an output that is cognitive in nature (Forbes and Milliken, 1999)
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partnerships, language barrier brought about a feeling of “us” and “them” resulting in an absence
of team spirit. On the other hand, having the same language might involve decreased
communication costs. Language is an instrument to report on what is really going on around and
this creates a kind of trust that is an absolutely essential necessity for effective performance and
functioning in IJVs.
What connects us with the origin of language is the human desire to establish connection with
one another and to express themselves (Corsen, 2009). When this connection takes place, an
interactive relationship between one’s traditions, conventions, and one’s verbal living
experiences as a society starts to be established. This process of interaction is what gives one’s
world its shape and therefore culture and language are what determine the perception of the
world around us. This relationship between language and human thought turns to be our cultural
reality. It is also the way by which humans relate to each other. (Gamsriegler, 2005) stressed that
verbal traditions plays a very important role in shaping perceptions. In other words, the
connection between language and people forms our relationship with knowledge through
opening a way that helps us in interpreting and understanding the world through its cultural
elements.
If we take the concept of “time” as an example; Time is perceived differently in the United
States than in the Czech Republic (Corsen, 2009). According to Corsen (2009), North Americans
think of the hour that just passed while the Czechs picture the hour that is coming ahead. If time
is 9:15, North Americans will tell it as a quarter past nine or fifteen minutes after nine while
Czechs will state it as a quarter of ten. North American will often address the hour emerging next
when time is coming near the hour. Hence 9:45 could be stated as a quarter to ten, but 9:15 is
seldom described as having an association with the hour coming up next. The time definitions
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given could seem insignificant, but these could show an inclination to concentrate on the past
instead of the future ahead and this is based on a particular interpretation and understanding of
time.
Another illustration of the differences in linguistic style that could affect communication and
lead to misunderstandings is the differences in cultures between partners (George et al., 1998).
For example in the United States and Germany, George et al. (1998) noted that people
communicate with each other without beating around the bush, their objective is to receive and
deliver information in a direct and explicit way with less regard to the context. As in China,
Korea and Japan, many words are left unsaid; people tend to confer the meaning of their
messages in an implicit and indirect way, through the physical context which involves facial
expressions, behavior, signs or signals, and tone of voice until the person engaged in the
conversation get or decodes the message in a right way. This is because their main objective is to
maintain and reinforce relationships by face-saving (Gamsriegler, 2005). Another difference is
shown in the way a Japanese and a German communicates as Gamsriegler (2005) explains. A
German will not be able to figure out or expect the needs of the others as he depends more on the
direct verbal message than relying on facial expressions, gestures, and tone of voice whereas a
Japanese relies more on body language.
Effort Norms:
Effort is an individual-level construct regarding the intensity and strength of individuals'
expected task performance behavior (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Effort norms as a group-level
construct are the shared beliefs of a group concerning the degree of effort each individual is
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expected to put towards a task assigned to. Norms usually have a strong impact on the behavior
of members, especially in groups such as boards.
A strong effort norms improves the effort of individual group members (Forbes & Milliken,
1999).Effort may be expressed by the time devoted to the duties or the time given for
maintaining accurately budgeted schedules. A relationship was found between time dedicated by
directors to their duties and effective governance. Particularly, directors who devote adequate
time to their tasks and try to obtain the information at a timely fashion are better capable of
thwarting or resolving crises. On the other hand, divergent perceptions of the time required to
accomplish negotiations, for example, may lead to impediments, failure, and negative affect
(George et al., 1998).
It was discovered that cultural differences in effort norms caused conflicts in U.S.-Chinese IJVs
(Bogun, 2008). Whereas the U.S. partner wished for a clearly and sharply outlined timetable, the
Chinese partner wanted a loose and non-binding schedule. A divergence is also noticed in the
work time standards and norms in the US and Japan on one hand, and in Hungary, India and
China, on the other hand. The software engineers, in both China and Hungary, exhibited striking
differences in the standards and norms of their work-time. Engineers in China stuck firmly to
time intervals when the workday started and ended, working strenuously during these periods,
but seldom functioning significantly longer. Chinese engineers showed marked resistance to the
likelihood of working extra hours or over weekends. As for the working hours in Hungary, they
were not as overwhelmingly long as they are in the US or Japan. In the US many types of
workers were likely to work seventy or eighty hours/week regularly, with additional effort
especially during laborious and hard times. On the other hand, a study conducted noted that
engineers in Japan tend to sacrifice their holidays, interests and hobbies, and even their family
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life for the sake of work. Therefore, it is found that differences existing in effort norms
pertaining to IJV partners could result in difficulties with control measures along with higher
governance costs which could eventually result in conflicts. Anxiety and nervousness ensue as a
result of uncertainty and lack of trust, which, in turn, lessens the degree of cooperation among
board members, as it was found in a research conducted on U.S. - Chinese IJVs operating in
China.
Hence, it is noted that the diversities and differences in functional area, perception, management
styles, and effort norms discussed above are the most common factors causing conflicts among
IJVs board members as shown in the below figure:

Figure 3-1- A Model of factors leading to conflicts in IJVs
Adapted from: Bogun (2008: 8)
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In this figure, four dimensions presented as possible reasons for arising of conflicts in IJVs:
functional area knowledge and skills, individual perceptions of reality; effort norms, and
management styles. Differences in functional area knowledge and skills along with differences in
perception of reality and interpretation of phenomena lead to the unawareness of board
members’ capabilities which consequently lead to difficulties in communication and transfer of
knowledge. Diversity in effort norms causes a lack of trust, arising of free-rider problem. Other
problems are poor preparation , and lack of trust, for instance, member A thinks member B did
not do the tasks he has been assigned and he is unprepared to consider the issues to be decided.
As for the differences in management styles, coordination difficulties pursue. All these
diversities in the four dimensions may cause management complexities leading to conflicts
which in turn affect adversely the IJV performance.

Literature Conclusion:
Building on the literature reviewed in the previous chapter, this study aims to investigate the
extent of differences in the perceptions of IJV board members representing the state with those
representing the private partners concerning corporate governance tools. Bottom line is that the
diversity in IJV board in terms of different backgrounds, expectations, goals, objectives
represents a challenge and this could in turn affect the satisfaction of both partners regarding the
implementation of good governance. IJV boards are more prone to suffer from conflicts because
they are more likely to have the characteristics that ignite conflicts, including differences in
functional areas, management styles, language, and effort norms.
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Chapter 4 : Methodology

Overview of the methodologies from the literature:
Several methodologies were found in the literature not directly addressing the aim of this
research which is Boardroom Governing Dynamics: A Case Study of State-Owned Oil and Gas
Joint ventures in Egypt.
The Board Directors Institute developed a methodology to explore board effectiveness in GCC
countries through a survey distributed on board members in order to improve board
effectiveness. The GCC Board Directors Institute (BDI) had done a survey on all GCC countries
on more than 100 GCC board members in 2009 and on more than 200 GCC board members in
2011 in order to figure out the recent important state of affairs regarding the effectiveness of the
board of directors (Building Better Boards, 2009 and Embarking on a Journey, 2011). The
intention of this survey is to identify the key strengths and opportunities for surmounting the
hurdles getting in the way of reinforcing board effectiveness in the region (Building Better
Boards, 2009), to drive business performance (GCC Board Effectiveness and Governance
Survey, 2009), to spread the spirit of team work, and to know how good do the directors
collaborate with senior leadership (Building Better Boards, 2009).
Oseichuk et al. (2009), in their research Workings of the board: Case of the International Joint
Venture "Arman", Kazakhstan, delve deep to answer “How does the Board of Directors of the
International Oil and Gas Joint Venture ‘Arman’ balance conflicting agendas whilst
contributing to responsible corporate practice?” they investigate the structure and composition
of the board of directors , their roles and duties, along with the way they balance different issues
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, which conflict with the practices of corporate responsibility. In their study, Oseichuk et al. used
semi-structured interviews- face-to-face and via emails, telephone as well as contextual
observation- a context driven observation. The interviews included International Joint Venture
“Arman” local and western board members along with local and western managers, regulatory
agencies and contractors- parties connected with the activities of the board (Oseichuk et al.,
2009). As for contextual observational method , Oseichuk et al. (2009) argued that it was
employed to “pick out what is relevant for analysis and piece it together to create tendencies,
sequences, patterns and orders” (Ericson et al., 1991: 55). This method was less structured; it
aimed to obtain “the perspectives of social actors, their ideas, attitudes, motives and intentions,
and the way they interpreted their social world” (Oseichuk et al., 2009: 113). It also intended to
qualitatively capture the human behavior so that it can explain shared culture as well as social
meaning. Triangulation method, that is comparing data collected from various sources, was also
adopted, it was employed to check whether the answers of the respondents were valid or not
(Oseichuk et al., 2009).
Methodologies Planned to be Employed in the Thesis:
The questionnaire used is based on one developed by the GCC Board of Directors Institute in the
UAE (GCC BDI)15, which conducted a board effectiveness survey in order to develop the
board’s performance. Although not specifically developed to compare local and foreign board
members of IJV boards, many of the issues addressed are similar to those dealt with in this study.
A modified form of the GCC BDI questionnaire, has been applied which originally developed by
McKinsey. It has been modified in collaboration with the thesis supervisor to lessen the number
of questions and make the survey more suitable to serve the aim of the study.
15

The GCC Board Directors Institute (BDI) is a non- profit organization aiming at promoting board effectiveness in
the GCC region.(Building Better Boards, 2009)
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This questionnaire, which is used with the permission of the BDI, addresses the following areas:
Board dynamics, delivery against key board roles, composition of the board, capabilities of the
directors, the roles and accountabilities of directors, structure of the board and, board
effectiveness and renewal policy. A 5-point Likert scale is also employed.
The survey is distributed in person by the researcher on the state-owned joint ventures in the oil
and gas sector in Egypt. The survey is distributed to 13 oil and gas JV companies where there are
8 board members in each (4 of them are representing the Egyptian Government and the other 4
are representing the foreign oil investor) after getting the permission of Ministry of Petroleum
(MoP) and CAPMAS. The criteria for selecting those 13 oil and gas JV companies were as
follows: Having an access to them, being state-owned Joint-venture companies, and having a
mix of domestic and foreign board members.

A quantitative analysis is employed relying on SPSS software analysis system (cross-tabulation
and bar charts) as well as descriptive analysis is also included. A qualitative analysis is also
employed where 12 board members were interviewed about what the challenges, they face in
their boards, hindering board effectiveness are.

Question Categories:
The survey questions will tackle 7 categories, which comprise of:
1. Please tell us a little about yourself
2. Board composition and director capabilities:
 Board composition and diversity
 Specific industrial and functional expertise
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 Capabilities and knowledge development
3. Director roles and accountabilities
 Director roles and accountabilities
 Roles and responsibilities of Board committees
 Board processes and protocols
4. Delivery on roles of the Board
 Strategy
 Performance management
 Attitudes toward company performance issues
 Risk management
 Talent management
5. Effective dynamics
 Preparation and participation
 Challenge and conflict
 Effective dynamics
 Interaction with senior management
6. Overall Board effectiveness and renewal
 Board renewal
 Board evaluation
7. Final Comments
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Limitation of the study:

Several factors imposed some limitations on this study. Access to state-owned joint
ventures in the oil and gas sector in Egypt tends to be very limited and difficult. Consequently
this constitute a barrier and a limitation in itself. Hence a further limitation was encountered,
which is the sample size. It was planned to have 8 surveys distributed on 25 companies with 8
board members in each but due to the difficulty of the access we only had 13 companies while
there are 41 state-owned JVs in the oil and gas sector in Egypt. I managed to obtain the approval
of the Ministry of Petroleum orally or more specifically via telephone. They refused that I go by
myself to the intended companies and rather offered to distribute the questionnaire but nothing
came out. I kept contacting them again and again and offered a final resolution to go by myself
but in vain. I finally resorted to distribute it through informal channels “contacts”. The research
also was constrained by the amount of time available as the whole study took 3 whole years and
has to be finished within the planned academic semester Spring/summer 2015. Financial
constraints also constituted another limitation as the research is not supported by any grants or
funds.
The successfulness of the outputs information generated from the survey depended on
one main factor which is the quality of the survey data obtained from board members; that is
their readiness to participate along with the level of forthrightness, honesty, and accuracy during
the answering of the survey questions.
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Chapter 5 : Analysis of Data

A quantitative analysis of the questionnaire of state-owned JV boards in the Oil
and Gas Sector in Egypt:
In this chapter, a quantitative analysis is going to be applied on a hundred board members in
state-owned JVs in the oil and gas sector. The aim of the analysis is to compare differences, in
perspectives towards corporate governance practices, lying between local- Egyptian board
members who represent the state as an owner, Egyptians representing the private partner on one
side and foreign board members or IJV boards on the other side in Egypt; it figures out what are
the barriers and hurdles that could prevent having an effective board in the Oil and Gas stateowned enterprises in Egypt.
The analysis will addresses the following areas that are tackled in the questionnaire: Board
dynamics, delivery against key board roles, composition of the board, capabilities of the
directors, the roles and accountabilities of directors, structure of the board, board effectiveness
and renewal policy.
According to the surveyed board members, it is clear that there is no huge differences in the
following sub-categories tackled in the questionnaire: specific industrial and knowledge
expertise – i.e. core governance and compliance , industry / sector expertise, talent management,
and functional knowledge-, the capabilities and knowledge development, Risk management,
Decision- making, Interaction with senior management, and Board evaluation. However, based
on the study, the differences exist in the following categories/sub categories:
1- Board Composition and Directors’ Capabilities:
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For the purpose of this study, board composition is defined as a combination of experiences and
knowledge, a mix of both different perspectives and backgrounds, and having the adequate
amount of time the board devotes to their roles.
The foreign board members of the private firms feel that their boards can be enhanced further by
taking those three actions:
-

Amendment of the nomination and appointment process of the directors.

-

Having the right board size by increasing the number of the board.

-

Introduction of independent directors into their board.

-

The rotation of the board should be addressed in a way that allows new talented members
could join in.

Having expertise on governance issues within the board according to an American board
member interviewed could be strengthened by having more knowledge on the newest trends in
management, industry, business, and board processes. Diversity in board composition should
also exist to reflect the population. The oil and gas state-owned joint ventures in Egypt consist of
8 board members and this is low number if it is compared to Europe which gives a room to
introduce independent directors into the board room. For example in the United Kingdom
independent directors constitute 91%, while in France they are 57%. In the GCC region, they
represent 46% (GCC, 2009).
The study reveals that there is a dissatisfaction with the board composition on the part of the
foreign board members who represent the foreign partner in the following areas:

Board composition and Diversity:
60

The study finds that 40% of the foreign board members representing the private partner see that
the effectiveness of the process of nomination and appointment of new board members need to
be tackled, while 48% think there is no problem with the process. As for the Egyptian board
members representing the private partner, 60% view that the process is effective and 22%
oppose. As for the local board members representing the state, 72% view there is nothing wrong
with the process whereas only 16% disagree/strongly disagree with this statement, as Figure (1)
and Figure (2) illustrate.

Figure 5-1: EBS (The Egyptian Board Members Representing the State) Nomination
and Appointing of New Directors

Source: Compiled by the Author

As Figure (5-1) shows the percentage of respondents of the EGY board members
representing the state (EBS) on whether the board has an effective process for nominating and
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appointing new directors. The EGY board members of the state (EBS) responded in the
following manner: 6% disagree, 12% neutral, 36% agree, and 36% strongly agree.
Figure 5-2: EBP (The EGY board members representing the private partner) and FBP (The foreign
boards representing the private partner) Nomination and Appointing of New Directors

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-2) shows the Percentage of respondents of the EGY board members representing the
private partner (EBP) and the foreign boards representing the private partner (FBP) on whether
the Board has an effective process for nominating and appointing new directors. The EBP
responded: 4.3 % strongly disagree, 17.4% disagree, 4.3% neutral, 69.6 % agree, 4.3% strongly
agree. The FBP: 14.8% strongly disagree, 25.9% disagree, 11.1 % neutral, 37% agree, 11.1%
strongly agree.
55% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose the view that the
board has an ideal size while only 33 %agree/strongly agree. While the Egyptian board members
representing the private partner, 69% agree/strongly agree and 30% disagree/ strongly disagree.
As for the board members representing the state, 70% adopt this view and only 8%
disagree/strongly disagree with this statement as (Figures 3and 4).
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Figure 5-3: EBS and the Right Board Size

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-3) illustrates the percentage of respondents of EBS on whether the board is
close to the right size for us to work together effectively. The EBS responded: 8% disagree, 22%
neutral, 42% agree, and 28% strongly agree.
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Figure 5-4: EBP, FBP and the Right Board Size

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-4) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
board is close to the right size for us to work together effectively. The EBP responded as: 8.7%
strongly disagree, 21.7% disagree, 34.8 % agree, 34.8% strongly agree whereas FBP responded
as 7.4% strongly disagree, 48.1% disagree, 11.1% neutral, and 33.3% agree.
Although there is no existence of independent or outside directors in the Oil and Gas state Joint
ventures, some have answered with agree/strongly agree to whether the number of independent
directors is enough or not which might indicate a slight deficiency in understanding the concept
of corporate governance fully as Figure 5 and 6 show .
It was found that 59% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that
there is sufficient number of independent directors on board, while 48% agree. As for the
Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 30% approve, while 8% want to see
more of this. As for the board members representing the state, around half of them adopt this
view and 24% does not back up this statement.
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Figure 5-5: EBS and the number of the Independent Directors

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-5) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the number of
independent directors on the board is sufficient to ensure the Board's independence. EBS
responded in the following manner: 4% strongly disagree, 20% disagree, 30% neutral, 34%
agree, and 12% strongly agree.
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Figure 5-6: EBP, FBP and the number of the Independent Directors

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-6) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
number of independent directors on the board is sufficient to ensure the Board's independence.
The EBP responded as 8.7% strongly disagree, 34.8% neutral, 47.8% agree, and 8.7% strongly
agree whereas FBP responded as: 40.7% strongly disagree, 18.5% disagree, 14.8% neutral, and
25.9 % agree.

41% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose the rotation of the board
members happen at an appropriate rate while only 25 %agree/ strongly agree. As for the Egyptian
board members representing the private partner, 70% adopt this view and 17% sees the opposite.
As for the board members representing the state, 46% agree/ strongly agree and only 30%
disagree/ strongly agree (Figure 7 and Figure 8).
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Figure 5-7: EBS and Board Rotation

Source: Compiled by the Author

As figure (5-7) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether board members
rotate at an adequate rate to allow new talent to join the board. EBS responded in the following
manner: 30% disagree, 24% neutral, 34% agree, and 12% strongly agree.

Figure 5-8: EBP, FBP and Board Rotation

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-8) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether board
members rotate at an adequate rate to allow new talent to join the Board. The EBP responded as:
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17.4 % disagree, 13% neutral, 60.9% agree, and 8.7% strongly agree whereas FBP responded as:
3.7% strongly disagree, 37% disagree, 33.3% neutral, 18.5% agree, and 7.4% strongly agree.
2- Director roles and accountabilities.
Board members are considered as the fiduciaries to navigate the ship/company towards the future
of sustainability and one of the responsibilities of the chairman of the board is to define in a clear
way the roles and responsibilities of each and every board member so every member get to know
where his authority starts and where the other’s begins.
The foreign board members feel that the two real barriers that hinder the defining of the
responsibilities and duties of the board members are the vague understanding of the board’s roles
as well as their way in resolving conflicts of interests.

Director Roles and accountabilities:
The study shows that 41% of the foreign board members representing the private partner do not
see that there is clear understanding of all other board member’s roles and responsibilities, while
29% approve. As for the EGY board members representing the private partner, 52%
agree/strongly agree and 30% disapprove. As for the EGY board members representing the state,
78% are content and 14% see the opposite (Figure 9 and 10).
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Figure 5-9: EBS and Understanding Roles

Source: Compiled by the Author

As figure (5-9) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether board members
have a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all other board members. EBS
responded in the following manner: 14% disagree, 8% neutral, 60% agree, and 18% strongly
agree.
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Figure 5-10: EBP, FBP and Understanding Roles

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-10) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether board
members have a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all other Board members.
The EBP responded as 4.3% strongly disagree, 26.1% disagree, 17.4% neutral, 30.4% agree, and
21.7% strongly agree whereas FBP responded as: 11.1% strongly disagree, 29.6% disagree,
29.6% neutral, 18.5% agree, and 11.1% strongly agree.
44% of the foreign members representing the private partner disagree with the ability of the board
to deal with conflicts of interests in a well-manner, while 11 % feel pleased with their board’s
ability in dealing with conflicts. As for the EGY board members representing the private partner,
26% supports the view and 22% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 28%
are satisfied with the performance whereas 36% see the opposite (Figure 11 and 12).
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Figure 5-11: EBS and Conflicts of Interests

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-11) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board
handles conflicts of interests appropriately (e.g., exclude the conflicted member from discussion
or voting). EBS responded in the following manner: 4% strongly disagree, 32% disagree, 36%
neutral, 18% agree, and 10% strongly agree.
Figure 5-12: EBP, FBP and Conflicts of Interests

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (5-12) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the board
handles conflicts of interests appropriately (e.g., exclude the conflicted member from discussion
or voting). The EBP responded as 4.3% strongly disagree, 17.4% disagree, 52.2% neutral, 17.4%
agree, and 8.7% strongly agree whereas FBP responded as: 22.2% strongly disagree, 22.2%
disagree, 44.4% neutral, 3.7% agree, and 7.4% strongly agree.
3- Board structure, processes, and protocols.
Boards establish committees to operate in an efficient way and get the work related to
governance done. It has the ability to decrease the rate of problems springing from conflicts of
interests of some board members.
The formation of board committees is important for the efficient operation of the board as well as
for the reduction of any problems resulting from the rise of any conflicts of interests. Many wellknown governance codes recommended the formation of three committees (nomination, audit,
and remuneration), although the remuneration and nomination committees are sometimes
combined into one (GCC, 2009). The average number of committees in Europe: United
Kingdom is 3.8, France is 3 while 3.5 in Germany. In the Egyptian state-owned JV boards in the
Oil and Gas Sector, separate committees are not prevalent within board.
According to survey foreign board respondents, to create a value, preparation of the board
materials and engagement actively in discussions should be improved. Improvements need to be
done in the organizational as well as strategic information in specific as interviewees clarified.
The role of the chairman needs also to be strengthened so that to increase the engagement of
board members in discussions and to improve the quality of information.

Roles and responsibilities of Board committees:
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41% of the foreign board members representing the private partner reject that all board members
understand the roles and duties of board committees (Although no establishment of any
committees within any board is there) while 33 % approve. As for the Egyptian board members
representing the private partner, 70% are supporting that, while 9% disapprove. As for the board
members representing the state, 66% adopt this view and 16% see the opposite (Figure 13 and
14).

Figure 5-13: EBS and Awareness of Committees’ Roles

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-13) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether All Board
members are fully aware of the roles and responsibilities of Board committees. The EBS
responded in the following manner: 12% disagree, 14% neutral, 62% agree, and 12% strongly
agree.
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Figure 5-14: EPB, FBP and Awareness of Committees’ Roles

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-14) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether All
Board members are fully aware of the roles and responsibilities of Board committees. The EBP
responded as: 4.3% strongly disagree, 4.3% disagree, 21.7% neutral, 43.5% agree, and 26.1%
strongly agree whereas FBP responded as: 25.9% strongly disagree, 14.8% disagree, 25.9%
neutral, and 33.3% agree.
30% of the foreign board members representing the private partner agree/strongly agree that the
board has an audit committee and consist of mainly independent directors, while 70 % approve.
As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 29.6% approve and 52%
disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 26% adopt this view and 32% see
the opposite. Though there are no existence of outside directors on the boards surveyed as I have
mentioned earlier, some answered the question with agree/strongly agree though which indicates
that the term of independent directors are not familiar or common within this sector (Figure 15
and 16).
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Figure 5-15: EBS and Audit Committee

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-15) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the Board has an
audit committee with a majority of independent board members. EBS responded in the following
manner: 4% strongly disagree, 28% disagree, 42% neutral, 22% agree, and 4% strongly agree.

Figure 5-16: EBP, FBP and Audit Committee

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (5-16) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
board has an audit committee with a majority of independent members. The EBP responded as:
13% strongly disagree, 17.4% disagree, 52.2 % agree, and 17.4% strongly agree, whereas FBP
responded as: 44.4% strongly disagree, 7.4% disagree, 18.5% neutral, 14.8% agree, and 14.8%
strongly agree.
Board processes and protocols:
4% of the foreign board members representing the private partner don’t agree/strongly agree
with the fact that the board is allowed an access to information in a timely fashion, while 32 %
approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 59% agree/
strongly agree and 41% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 96% agree/
strongly (Figure 17 and 18).

Figure 5-17: EBS and Information Received

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (5-17) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on the Board has access to
adequate, relevant, and timely information. EBS responded in the following manner: 4% neutral,
54% agree, and 42% strongly agree.
Figure 5-18: EBP, FBP and Information Received

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-18) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
board has access to adequate, relevant, and timely information. The EBP responded as: 4.3 %
disagree, 13% neutral, and 82.6% agree, whereas FBP responded as: 7.4% strongly disagree,
33.3% disagree, 25.9% neutral, and 33.3% agree.
44% of the foreign board members representing the private partner do not see that the meeting
agenda and related materials are sent prior to the meeting, while 25 % approve that all materials
are sent in the right time. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner,
83% agree and 4.3% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 92% support
this (Figure 19 and 20).
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Figure 5-19: EBS and Materials

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-19) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the materials for
the Board meetings are sent out well in advance of the meeting. EBS responded in the following
manner: 8% neutral, 50% agree, and 42% strongly agree.

Figure 5-20: EBP, FBP and Materials

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (5-20) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
materials for the board meetings are sent out well in advance of the meeting. The EBP responded
as: 4.3 % disagree, 13 % neutral, 56.5% agree, and 26.1% strongly agree, whereas FBP
responded as: 3.7% strongly disagree, 40.7% disagree, 29.6% neutral, and 25.9% agree.
40.7% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree/ strongly agree
that the agenda of the board meeting brings the right topics to the front for discussion, while
48.1 % approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 87%
back up this and 4.3% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 94%
supports that (Figure 21 and 22).

Figure 5-21: EBS and Meeting Agenda

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-21) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the Board
meeting agenda prioritizes the right topics for discussion. The EBS responded in the following
manner: 6% neutral, 52% agree, and 42% strongly agree.
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Figure 5-22: EBP, FBP and Meeting Agenda

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-22) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
Board meeting agenda prioritizes the right topics for discussion. The EBP responded as: 4.3%
disagree, 8.7% neutral, 43.5% agree, and 43.5% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as:
7.4% strongly disagree, 33.3% disagree, 11.1 % neutral, 33.3% agree, and 14.8% strongly agree.
44% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree/ strongly disagree
with the fact that the board meetings materials tackles the items for discussions in an effective
manner, while 44 % approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private
partner, 74% back up and 4.3% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state,
90% adopt this view (Figure 23 and 24).
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Figure 5-23: EBS and Addressing Topics Effectively

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-23) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the materials
prepared for board meetings effectively address the topics for discussion. EBS responded in the
following manner: 10% neutral, 66% agree, and 24% strongly agree.

Figure 5-24: EBP, FBP and Addressing Topics
Effectively

Source: Compiled by the Author

81

Figure (5-24) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
materials prepared for Board meetings effectively address the topics for discussion. The EBP
responded as: 4.3 % disagree, 21.7% neutral, 60.9% agree, and 13% strongly agree, whereas
FBP responded as: 11.1% strongly disagree, 33.3% disagree, 11.1% neutral, 40.7% agree, and
3.7% strongly agree.
40.7% of the foreign board members representing the private partner does not support the fact
that materials are could be read and understood easily, whereas 44.4% approve. As for the
Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 83% agree/strongly agree and 13%
disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 84% adopt this view and 2% see
the opposite (Figure 25 and 26).

Figure 5-25: EBS and Preparation Materials

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (5-25) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether preparation
materials are concise and easy to read and understand. EBS responded in the following manner:
2% disagree, 14% neutral, 50% agree, and 34% strongly agree.

Figure 5-26: EBP, FBP and Preparation Materials

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-26) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether
Preparation materials are concise and easy to read and understand. The EBP responded as: 8.7%
strongly disagree, 4.3% disagree, 4.3% neutral, 47.8% agree, and 34.8% strongly agree, whereas
FBP responded as 22.2% strongly disagree, 18.5% disagree, 14.8% neutral, 40.7% agree, and
3.7% strongly agree.

4- Delivery on Roles of the board:
Three major obligations of the board were highlighted: the formulation and reviewing of the
strategic plan, supervision of health and performance, and dealing with major risks factors
encountering the organization.
According to the foreign board members surveyed, board members need to spend enough time
on talent, risk, and strategy management as well as improving the quality of discussions on those
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areas. The interviewees have expressed their dissatisfaction with the formulation of the strategy
in a clear way. A retreat in this case could be the best solution for brainstorming and developing
a suitable vision and strategy for the company. A talent management expertise should be invited
to the board starting the selection process to the retention one. This could be done through
offering training courses as well as frequent reading benchmarks, analyst reports, and
management periodicals to develop the capabilities of the board members (GCC, 2009).

Strategy:
52% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose the fact that
board members devote more quality time for defining and reviewing strategy, while 33 %
approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 35% back up
this and 17% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 33% adopt this
view (Figure 27 and 28).

Figure 5-27: EBS and Involvement in Strategy Development

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (5-27) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether Board members
are sufficiently involved in strategy development. EBS responded in the following manner: 34%
neutral, 46% agree, and 20% strongly agree.
Figure 5-28: EBP, FBP and Involvement in Strategy Development

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-28) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether Board
members are sufficiently involved in strategy development. The EBP responded as: 17.4 %
disagree, 21.7% neutral, 34.8% agree, and 26.1% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as:
18.5% strongly disagree, 33.3% disagree, and 14.8% neutral, 33.3% agree.
44% of the foreign board members representing the private partner does not feel that the board
dedicate a sufficient amount of time on discussing important issues related to strategy, whereas
29% approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 43% approve
of that and 22% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 35% agree/strongly
agree and 8% disagree/ strongly disagree (Figure 29 and 30).
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Figure 5-29: EBS and Time discussing Strategy Issues

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-29) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether board members
spend enough time discussing strategy issues. EBS responded in the following manner: 8%
disagree, 22% neutral, 48% agree, and 22% strongly agree.

Figure 5-30: EBP, FBP and Time discussing Strategy Issues

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (5-30) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether board
members spend enough time discussing strategy issues. The EBP responded as: 21.7 % disagree,
34.8% neutral, 30.4% agree, and 13% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as 3.7% strongly
disagree, 40.7% disagree, 25.9% neutral, 25.9% agree, and 3.7% strongly agree.
Performance management:
30% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that all board
members understand how well the company is operating, while 18 % approve. As for the
Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 70% approve and 9% disapprove. As
for the board members representing the state, 90% back up this (Figure 31 and 32).

Figure 5-31: EBS and Understanding of the Org. performance

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-31) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board has a
real understanding of how well the organization is performing. EBS responded in the following
manner: 10% neutral, 62% agree, and 28% strongly agree.
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Figure 5-32: EBP, FBP and Understanding of the Org. performance

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-32) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
board has a real understanding of how well the organization is performing. The EBP responded
as: 4.3% strongly disagree, 4.3% disagree, 21.7% neutral, 39.1% agree, and 30.4% strongly
agree, whereas FBP responded as: 7.4% strongly disagree, 18.5% disagree, 55.6% neutral, and
18.5% agree.
33% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree/ strongly disagree
with the fact that the Board pays attention to a set of health indicators e.g. the rate of employee
attrition, while 41% approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private
partner, 65% back up and 26% disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 54%
support this and 14% see the opposite (Figure 33 and 34).

88

Figure 5-33: EBS and Tracking of Health Indicators

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-33) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board is tracking a
set of health indicators (e.g., employees’ attrition rate, customer satisfaction, new products share
of revenue). EBS responded in the following manner: 14% disagree, 32% neutral, 32% agree,
and 22% strongly agree.

Figure 5-34: EBP, FBP and Tracking of Health Indicators

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (5-34) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
Board is tracking a set of health indicators (e.g., employees attrition rate, customer satisfaction,
new products share of revenue).The EBP responded as: 4.3% strongly disagree, 21.7% disagree,
8.7% neutral, and 65.2% agree, whereas FBP responded as: 3.7% strongly disagree, 29.6%
disagree, 25.9% neutral, 37% agree, and 3.7% strongly agree.
Attitudes toward company performance issues:
22% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disapprove of the elimination
of jobs to increase profitability, while 52% approve. As for the Egyptian board members
representing the private partner, 52% back up and 26% disapprove. As for the board members
representing the state, 32% adopt this view and 48% see the opposite (Figure 35 and 36).

Figure 5-35: EBS and Job Elimination

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-35) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether it is appropriate
to eliminate jobs if this is necessary to increase the company's profitability. EBS responded in
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the following manner: 2% strongly disagree, 30% disagree, 20% neutral, 40% agree, and 8%
strongly agree.

Figure 5-36: EBP, FBP and Job Elimination

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-36) shows percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether it is
appropriate to eliminate jobs if this is necessary to increase the company's profitability. The EBP
responded as: 26.1% strongly disagree, 13% disagree, 43.5% agree, and 17.4% strongly agree,
whereas FBP responded as: 3.7% strongly disagree, 7.4% disagree, 22.2% neutral, 40.7%agree,
and 25.9% strongly agree.
Talent management:
33% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree, while 25%
approve of the fact that board members are all involved in managing talents in an effective
way (i.e., selecting talented members, compensating the talented, development and
evaluating board members to discover skills and benefit from the talented). As for the
Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 47% back up and 26%
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disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 78% adopt this view and 4%
see the opposite (Figure 37and 38).

Figure 5-37: EBS and Involvement in Talent Management

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-37) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board is
effectively involved in talent management (i.e., selection, compensation, evaluation,
development, and succession planning of critical positions in the top management team). EBS
responded in the following manner: 4% disagree, 18% neutral, 52% agree, and 26% strongly
agree.
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Figure 5-38: EBP, FBP and Involvement in Talent Management

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-38) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
Board is effectively involved in talent management (i.e., selection, compensation, evaluation,
development, and succession planning of critical positions in the top management team).The
EBP responded as: 26.1% disagree, 26.1% neutral, and 47.8% agree, whereas FBP responded as:
7.4% strongly disagree, 25.9% disagree, 40.7% neutral, 18.5% agree, and 7.4% strongly agree.
33% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that the board spends
enough time on talent management, while 29 % approve. As for the Egyptian board members
representing the private partner, 43% back up and 26% disapprove. As for the board members
representing the state, 22% adopt this view and 22% see the opposite (Figure 39and 40).
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Figure 5-39: EBS and Discussions of Talent Management

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-39) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board spends
sufficient time discussing talent management issues. EBS responded in the following manner:
4% strongly disagree, 18% disagree, 56% neutral, 20% agree, and 2% strongly agree.

Figure 5-40: EBP, FBP and Discussions of Talent Management

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (40) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
board spends sufficient time discussing talent management issues. The EBP responded as: 26.1
% disagree, 30.4% neutral, 26.1% agree, and 17.4% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as:
3.7% strongly disagree, 29.6% disagree, 37% neutral, and 29.6% agree.
37% of the foreign board members representing the private partner are not satisfied with the process
of documentation for succession plans of critical job positions, while 25% approve. As for the
Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 26% are satisfied and 44% disapprove.
As for the board members representing the state, 40% are content and 36% see the opposite (Figure
41and 42).
Figure 5-41: EBS and Succession Plans

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-41) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the Board has a
documented process of succession plans for all critical positions. EBS responded in the following
manner: 4% strongly disagree, 32% disagree, 24% neutral, 38% agree, and 2% strongly agree.
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Figure 5-42: EBP, FBP and Succession Plans

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-42) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
Board has a documented process of succession plans for all critical positions. The EBP
responded as: 43.5 % disagree, 30.4% neutral, and 26.1% strongly agree, whereas FBP
responded as: 37 % disagree, 37% neutral, and 25.9% agree.
5- Effective dynamics:
Board dynamics include: adequate preparation for board meetings, being effectively
engaged in discussions and know the purpose of them.
The foreign board members expressed their dissatisfaction with how conflicts are resolved.
To solve that the board members should know that they are a team “and can take advantage
of much of the research available on the drivers of team effectiveness. Taking the time to
openly discuss the board’s performance as a team, working on building better personal
connections and shared understanding between board members and, more broadly, finding a
style and rhythm of interactions that suits the individuals involved can all contribute to
better dynamics in the board room. The board has a vital role and substantial fiduciary duty
to perform — but that need not detract from it functioning as a well performing team where
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members are genuinely stimulated and excited by their roles and interactions with each
other” (GCC, 2009:27).
Preparation and participation:
44% of the foreign board members representing the private partner disapprove of the
fact that all board members prepare right for meetings, while 29 % approve. As for
the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 83% back up and 29%
disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 70% adopt this view and
6% see the opposite (Figure 43and 44).
Figure 5-43: EBS and Preparation for Meetings

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-43) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether all board
members prepare well for board meetings. EBS responded in the following manner: 6% disagree,
24% neutral, 54% agree, and 16% strongly agree.
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Figure 5-44: EBP, FBP and Preparation for Meetings

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-44) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether all
Board members prepare well for Board meetings. The EBP responded as: 13 % disagree, 4.3 %
neutral, and 82.6 % agree, whereas FBP responded as: 44.4 % disagree, 25.9% neutral, and
29.6% agree.
44% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that all board
members are involved in debates and discussions in meetings, while 37 % approve. As for
the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, 60% back up and 17%
disapprove. As for the board members representing the state, 94% adopt this view and 2%
see the opposite (Figure 45 and 46)
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Figure 5-45: EBS and Engagement in Board Discussions

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-45) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether all board
members are engaged in board discussions. EBS responded in the following manner: 2%
disagree, 4% neutral, 74% agree, and 20% strongly agree.
Figure 5-46: EBP, FBP and Engagement in Board Discussions

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-46) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether all
board members are engaged in board discussions. The EBP responded as: 17.4 % disagree,
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21.7% neutral, 39.1% agree, and 21.7% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 3.7%
strongly disagree, 40.7% disagree, 18.5% neutral, and 37% agree.
30% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that all members are
aware of the purpose of discussions running in meetings, while 37% approve. As for the Egyptian
board members representing the private partner, 87% back up and 9% disapprove. As for the board
members representing the state, 82% adopt this view and 4% see the opposite (Figure 47and 48).

Figure 5-47: EBS and Purpose of Discussions

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-47) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether board members
are always clear on the purpose of their discussions. EBS responded in the following manner: 4%
disagree, 14% neutral, 62% agree, and 20% strongly agree.
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Figure 5-48: EBP, FBP and Purpose of Discussions

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-48) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether board
members are always clear on the purpose of their discussions. The EBP responded as: 8.7 %
disagree, 4.3% neutral, 73.9% agree, and 13% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 29.6%
disagree, 33.3% neutral, and 37% agree.
Challenge and conflicts:
52% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose that the board is
able to reach closure on issues that are difficult, while 22 % approve. As for the Egyptian
board members representing the private partner, 48% back up. As for the board members
representing the state, 66% adopt this view and 4% see the opposite (Figure 49 and 50).
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Figure 5-49: EBS and Reaching Closure

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-49) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the board is able to
reach closure on difficult decisions. EBS responded in the following manner: 4% disagree, 30%
neutral, 50% agree, and 16% strongly agree.
Figure 5-50: EBP, FBP and Reaching Closure

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (5-50) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
board is able to reach closure on difficult decisions. The EBP responded as: 52.2 % neutral,
43.5% agree, and 4.3 % strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 7.4% strongly disagree,
14.8% disagree, 25.9% neutral, and 51.9% agree.
6- Overall effectiveness and renewal:
According to the foreign board members interviewed, an evaluation should be conducted; it
should assess the board’s performance as a whole as well as the directors individually. In terms
of mechanics, the evaluation process can be delivered by self-assessments, external assessments
or a combination of the two. Self-assessments, which involve the board reviewing itself against
certain criteria, are easier to implement and less threatening than assessments by outsiders, thus
making directors more likely to accept the evaluation process. However, some disadvantages
include subjective responses, the potential unwillingness of some board members to honestly
review the work of their tenured peers, and the prospect of outsiders discounting the final
assessment as less than impartial. Formal assessments involve a board review by an independent
third party. One benefit of a formal assessment is the likelihood that it will be viewed as
impartial. The disadvantages are that the process is more complicated, more time is needed, and
directors are more likely to feel threatened than under a self-assessment” (GCC, 2009: 29). The
board members are the one to decide which type of evaluation to take depending on the trust as
well as the openness level prevalent among the board.
The study shows that there were differences in opinions towards board renewal as the following
points illustrate:
Board renewal:
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30% of the foreign board members representing the private partner opine that the board takes
time to form an opinion about and discuss existing challenges encountering the organization
and the available opportunities for improvements, while 52% approve. As for the Egyptian
board members representing the private partner, 52% back up and 17% disapprove. As for
the board members representing the state, 64% adopt this view and 14% see the opposite
(Figure 51 and 52).

Figure 5-51: EBS and Time Taken for Reflection on Issues

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-51) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the Board takes
the time to step back and reflect on how effective it is and what the challenges and opportunities
for improvement are. EBS responded in the following manner: 14% disagree, 22% neutral, 54%
agree, and 10% strongly agree.
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Figure 5-52: EBP, FBP and Time Taken for Reflection on Issues

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-52) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the
Board takes the time to step back and reflect on how effective it is and what the challenges and
opportunities for improvement are. The EBP responded as: 17.4 % disagree, 30.4% neutral, and
52.2% agree, whereas FBP responded as: 29.6 % disagree, 18.5% neutral, and 51.9% agree.
30% of the foreign board members representing the private partner oppose the fact that there is
flexibility of the board in matters of reprioritizing important issues that necessitates quick
intervention, while 63 % approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private
partner, 100% back up. As for the board members representing the state, 80% adopt this view and
10% see the opposite as seen in Figure (52 and 53).
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Figure 5-53: EBS and Flexibility

Source: Compiled by the Author

Figure (5-53) shows the percentage of respondents of (EBS) on whether the Board is
flexible enough to reprioritize when the situation demands it. EBS responded in the following
manner: 10% disagree, 10% neutral, 70% agree, and 10% strongly agree.

Figure 5-54: EBP, FBP and Flexibility

Source: Compiled by the Author
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Figure (5- 54) shows percentage of respondents of (EBP) and (FBP) on whether the board
is flexible enough to reprioritize when the situation demands it. The EBP responded as: 69.6 %
agree, and 30.4% strongly agree, whereas FBP responded as: 25.9% disagree, 11.1% neutral,
59.3% agree, and 3.7% strongly agree.
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Chapter 6 : Study Findings

This chapter sums up the key findings based on the survey results of the quantitative analysis
employed in the study. The study also intended to find a correlation between differences towards
the practices of governance, experience (in terms of number of boards that members served on),
and education, but the results were insignificant and we are limited by both space and time. The
analysis discussed in the previous chapter has revealed that differences towards governance
practices do exist between local- Egyptian board members who represent the state as an owner,
Egyptians representing the private partner, and foreign board members or IJV boards as they will
be discussed in this chapter. No significant difference is found between Egyptians board
members representing the private partner and those members representing the state on board. The
striking contrast is found in the six “levers” (GCC Board Effectiveness and Governance Survey,
2009: 10) as shown in the chapter of the analysis between the foreign board members, and those
Egyptian board members representing the private partner as well as the state.
The results of the questionnaire shows that nearly half of foreign board members who are
representing the private partner are not satisfied with the board composition and the capabilities
of the directors which is considered an important factor in achieving board effectiveness.
Whereas more or less quarter of the Egyptian board members representing the private partner
and of those representing the state feel the contrary. An American board member when
interviewed says that in order for the board to be effective “The board should be aware of the
latest trends of international board practices and applying them in the right manner. The board
should consist of a mix of directors with more knowledge and expertise so that to manage well

108

the challenges we encounter” while an Indian board member said that “bringing an expertise in
financial stewardship is needed”. Egyptian private board member mentioned that “the directors
should reach a high degree of creativity to enable them to develop the organization. They need to
be more professionals, and efficient...” two Egyptian state board member say also “The board
members should be selected based on a fair criteria – their experiences and expertise- not
through favoritism, cronyism, or nepotism. That people with experience, and efficiency should
be rewarded for motivation so that our board could achieve an effective performance”. Another
state board member say “The secretary of the board should have the necessary expertise ...Have
the quality of integrity and honesty not manipulating the situation for his/her own interests”.
According to the members surveyed as illustrated, more or less half of the foreign board
members representing the private partner want to see more of understanding of the duties of all
the rest of board members, while only quarter of the Egyptian board members representing the
private partner disagree. As for the board members representing the state, they agree that there is
an accurate understanding of the duties of the board but quarter of them view that the board is
incapable of dealing with conflicts of interests in the right way. A Canadian board member
mentioned that “there should be an orientation program to introduce them to the responsibilities
and duties they will be holding”
The research shows a lack of independent directors though their presence will add a lot of value
in the board.
Nearly half of the Egyptian board members representing the private partner disagree that the
board is allowed an access to information in the right time, whereas the foreign board members
representing the private partner and the board members representing the state agree to this. As
for the agenda and materials preparation given to board, almost half of the foreign board
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members representing the private partner disagree while the majority of the Egyptian board
members representing the private partner and the board members representing the state agree.
The quality of information received by the board and, the preparation for and engagement level
in meetings need be improved to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the board. An
Egyptian Private board member says “training programs in management, governance and
presentation skills should be devised for the board to improve their performance”.
More or less half of the foreign board members representing the private partner are not satisfied
with the strategy formulation or the discussion about strategy. Whereas more than quarter of the
Egyptian board members representing the private partner as well as the board members
representing the state are content.
Nearly quarter of the foreign board members representing the private partner are not satisfied
with the management of performance in terms of understanding organization performance and
how well it is, as well as of the tracing of health indicators, whereas the majority of the Egyptian
board members representing the private partner and the board members representing the state are
satisfied with the performance in general.
Around half of the foreign board members and the Egyptian board members representing the
private partner agree to eliminate jobs if it was necessary while only quarter of the board
members representing the state reject that.
Around quarter of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree with the
way board is handling talent management, whereas the Egyptian board members representing the
private partner are satisfied except in the process of plans documentation regarding succession
ones for important position. The majority of the board members representing the state feel that
there is nothing wrong with talent management.
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Hence there is a need to dedicate more time to strategy, performance, talent, and risk
management. An Indian board member say that “the board needs to develop the key performance
indicators and financial objectives”. Another one say “There should be an up-to-date internal
system with rules and laws to regulate the inner workings of the board e.g. voting system ,
holding and scheduling of meetings, etc.. which will help board members in making sound
decisions”. An Egyptian board member added that “There should be a sound plan for board
members succession to prepare a new generation or second row of new leaders by devising a
leadership development program. Evaluation of the board’s and top managers’ performance
should be conducted from time to time so the weaknesses and strengths could be detected”.
Half of the foreign board members representing the private partner does not support the
statement that says the board is capable to take decisions regarding difficult issue, while only
quarter approve. As for the Egyptian board members representing the private partner, around half
of them think the board has the ability to do so. As for the board members representing the state,
more than half agree.
Around quarter of the foreign board members representing the private partner disagree with the
way the board is dealing with opportunities and challenges when needed as well as disapprove
with the board being inflexible in facing any critical situations when appear, whereas the
Egyptian board members representing the private partner and the board members representing
the state are satisfied.
Other challenges regarding decision-making are tackled during the interviews. One of the
Egyptian board member who represents the state as an owner says that “the foreign member has
the upper hand and the board members have no say in anything and this out of fear from the
fleeing of investments….The foreign partner is cuddled especially after the law stipulated that
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the shares should be 50/ 50. Now the foreign partner is poking his nose in everything even in the
affairs or issues that relates to the Egyptian employees in terms of promotions, remuneration, and
bonuses, though whatever he pays, the EGPC pay him back later. The foreign partner gives
himself the green light to delay any agreed drilling plans in the budget) to the next year without
any penalties in some cases under the plea of force majeure, the decrease in the price of oil, or
lack of financial liquidity and that’s against the plans set by the government”. Another one
mentioned that “The partners or shareholders should be flexible in financing the necessary work
activities”.

 Here we will look into the findings of the GCC Board Directors Institute’s (BDI) reports
in 2009, 2011, and 2013 on the publicly-listed companies in GCC countries. The first
report in 2009 covered the 200 top companies where more than 100 board members have
completed the survey. In the second report of 2011, 200 board members have participated
while in 2013, there is no mention of the sample number. Findings are as follow:
 In 2009:
1- Board composition and capabilities of directors need to be improved.
2- A good amount of time need to be devoted by the board members to their duties and
roles.
3- There is a substantial lack of international expertise on the GCC boards. As for the
presence of Independent directors from outside the region, they represent less than 3 %.
4- It was found that there is a very limited use of specialized committees (i.e. audit
remuneration, and nomination) in the GCC region.
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5- More time is needed to be devoted to their core board roles in terms of strategy, risk, and
talent management.
6- Board dynamics need to be improved in terms of the quality of information, preparation
for meetings and the board’s engagement level during debates in the meetings.
7- An evaluation process needs to be conducted.
8- Executive committee is the one of the GCC boards’ used common practices, but the use
of this committee is not effective to organizations with such productive performance and
size.

 In 2011:
1- Improvement of the board composition and capabilities of the directors still represent a
barrier to board effectiveness.
2- International expertise is still missing.
3- GCC board specialized committees ( audit, remuneration , and nomination as mentioned
in the report recommendations) doubled in number more than they used to be in 2009
4- The number of the independent directors has also increased.
5- The boards still need to devote more time to their roles and responsibilities, risk, strategy,
and talent management.
6- Executive committees are still in use and increased.
7- Preparation for meetings and engagement in discussions are still a barrier.
8- Self- evaluation is still missing.

 In 2013:
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1- More awareness of the GCC board members of their duties and roles is recognized in
terms of the internal board processes, enforcing accountability and corporate governance.
2- No development happened in the board composition and the skills of the board.
3- More time is still needed for strategy management.
4- Board members are not rotating at a speedy rate so that to bring new spirits into the
board. This is due to the close ties existing between family and business.
5- A striking rise in the numbers of board members who approves that the participation of
the board members becomes more active at the board meetings.
6- Talent management is still missing and no succession plans for critical positions is made.
7- No evaluation process.
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Chapter 7 : Conclusions and recommendations
The study reveals that there are several differences in the perspectives of board members towards
corporate governance practices which in turn could influence board effectiveness in a negative
way. Hence, there are some actions that the boards of the oil and gas state joint ventures in Egypt
should consider:
1- Nomination and appointment process:
In nominating new board candidates, seeking sector-specific talents is an excellent way to
manage to build a strong board that an organization grows into (Ward, 2012). The selected
director should possess a mix of skills, knowledge, and experiences-e.g. governance, thinking in
a strategic way...etc.-, though this is not enough to produce a perfect profile of a board. A
diversity in the board composition should exist in terms of gender, age, and professional practice.
In a nutshell there is no fixed formula to reach an ideal board. Therefore, before nomination, it is
advised to go over the sector’s strategy and the board’s job description so as to link between
goals, priorities, and competencies aimed for, in order to determine what experience in which
area is mostly needed (MIoD, 2012).
2- Size of the board:
The issue of the ideal size of the board is very debatable. There is no one-fits-all size for this
because every organization has its own demands and needs. It depends on the structure of
governance, regulatory requirements, as well as which stage of growth the organization in. the
average and recommended size is from 10 to 12 board members (Ward, 2012). Few points
should be taken into consideration upon deciding to set out the board size: discussions going on
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the board room is constructive and fruitful, the board consists of independent directors (one third
of the board would be ideal), the number of members is sufficient to make the work flow going
faster, the quorum size is enough to take quick decisions in important matter, the composition of
board committees consists of and headed mainly by independent directors, and there is a separate
chairman and CEO (MIoD, 2012).
3- Recruitment of independent board members:
Having independent board members is very important. First to avoid that no one dominate the
process of decision-making, as the allegiance to the chairman could lead to an atmosphere that
stifles discussion and debate. Second to reflect the big picture so that to prevent by that this false
report of “everything is going just fine”.
4- Women on board seats:
Women are scarcely found in the boardroom, which means there is no diversity of gender,
thought, or experience.
5- Bringing international expertise into the boardroom:
The focus should be on attracting board members with best international practice experience.
6- Establishment of board committees ( audit, nomination, and evaluation) to avoid
any rise of conflicts of interests in those areas:
For example an audit committee should be created with a majority of independent directors. Its
duty is to supervise the practices and activities of management in crucial governance domains
e.g. values, morals and ethics, annual reports, plans set by management, risk management,
financial statements, and structure of governance. This will increase transparency of the public
sector in those above mentioned areas (IIAs, 2014). Although the legislation puts the power of

116

nominating new board members in the hands of the minister solely, a nominating committee
could also be established so it can be involved in the process of nomination by setting the criteria
for selecting ideal board candidates. It is also responsible for designing continuing education
programs for new directors to enhance their skills. It creates orientation programs for new
directors so as to be familiar with the organization’s strategy and challenges it is encountering.
Establishing evaluation committee is also recommended so as to evaluate the performance of the
organization- in terms of its mission, targets and goals-, the chairman and board of directors as
well as of the work of other committees on a yearly basis and identify strengths and weaknesses
suggesting areas of improvements. Then coming up with recommendations in adherence with the
policies and requirements of the sector. After the creation of those committees, a well- defined
job description and a work plan for each committee should be set upfront so that each committee
and every board member know clearly their exact responsibilities and duties.
7- The materials for the meetings of the board:
The chairman, with the assistance of the management, should draft the agenda and materials for
every meeting. Materials should be sent out in advance of holding the meeting. Time should be
devoted to the items on the meeting agenda according to their value. The presenter should not
keep repeating what the board already read rather it should add to what is already mentioned for
not wasting time. Last- minute issues could be briefly discussed over the phone so that to make
sure everyone knows what is going to happen in the meeting and becomes actively engage in
discussions (Ward, 2012).
8- Handling of conflicts of interests:
Any board member with conflict of interests should abstain from voting, though this seems very
utopian (Ward, 2012).
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9- Devote appropriate time to risk oversight, talent and strategy management:
This will reflect on the ability of the board to engage actively on key issues in those areas.

10- The merit-based system need to be amended.
It should be based on the candidates’ abilities and experiences.

Hence, the study reveals several dimensions that could be a fertile soil for growing conflicts in
the future resulting from differences in the perspectives towards the corporate governance
practices in the oil and gas state joint-ventures in Egypt between the foreign board members
representing, the private partner, the Egyptian board members representing the private partners,
and the state board members. It gives insights for policy makers and board of directors on how to
overcome such barriers. Future researches may examine the issue on a bigger scale.
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APPENDIX 1
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC
BUSINESS SECTORS:
Sector

Public Sector

Public Business Sector

Structure
Law

Public Sector Authorities
Law no. 97/1983 which is
amended by law no.
109/87

Legal Status

an independent entity
under the
General Law

Supervision

Competent Minister
specified in
its establishment
presidential
decree
Board of directors
appointed
upon a presidential decree
and
proposed by the
competent
minister for four years

Public sector authorities

funds of authorities owned
by
the state unless otherwise
declared in its
establishment
decree

Management

Ownership

Public Sector Companies
Public sector companies
are
subject to:
− Law no. 97/1983 which is
amended by law no.
109/87
− law no. 159/1981 where
no
specific provision of law no.
97/1983 is provided
Joint stock company

Holding Companies
Holding companies are
subject
to:
− Law no. 203/1991, and
− law no. 159/1981 where
no
specific provision of law no.
203/1991 is provided

Subsidiary Companies
Subsidiary companies are
subject to:
− Law no. 203/1991, and
− law no. 159/1981 where
no
specific provision of law
203/1991 is provided

Holding companies take the
form of joint stock
companies
and are considered as one of
special law persons
Competent Minister
specified by
a presidential decree

Joint stock company

Board of directors consists
of:
− a chairman nominated by
the
competent Minister and
appointed by a decree
issued
by the Prime Minister
− members appointed by
the
competent minister
represent
a) 50% of total members if
the company is fully owned
by public entities; or b) the
same proportion of public
entities share in the capital
− members representing
private
individuals proportionate
to their share in the capital
− other members are
elected
among employees
according
to law no 73/1973

Board of directors is formed
by
a resolution of the general
assembly upon a proposal by
the
company chairman for three
years which are renewable
and
consists of an odd number of
members not less than seven
and
not more than seven as
follows:
− a full-time chairman
− a number of members not
less
than five selected from
persons having experience in
economic, financial,
technical, legal and business
administration fields
− a representative of the
Egyptian workers general
federation of syndicate to be
selected by the federation’s
board of directors

A public sector company is
any
company either: a) owned
by a
public entity alone or in
participation with other

The capital of holding
companies is fully owned by
the
state or public judicial
persons

− a company whose capital is
fully owned by a single or
multiple holding companies,
public entities or public
sector
banks is managed by a board
of directors appointed for a
renewable term of three
years.
This board consists of an odd
number of directors not less
than five and not more than
nine including the board
chairman as follows: a) a
part-time
chairman appointed by
general assembly, b) a parttime experienced members
appointed by the holding
company’s board of
directors,
c) a number of members
equal
to experienced members to
be
elected from employees
according to law regulating
this matter
− chairman of the committee
of
syndicate who is not counted
as a voting member
Holding companies must
own at
least 51% its capital
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Holding companies

public
entities and public sector
banks
or companies, or b) one or
more
of public entities
participate with
private individuals and
public
share of capital, including
the
share of public banks and
companies, must be not
less than
51% of total capital.

Source: (Ghoneim, 2005: 164)
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APPENDIX 2
AFFILIATED COMPANIES OF HOLDING COMPANIES (EGAS,
ECHEM, GANOPE)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Affiliated companies of EGAS
Rashid Petroleum Company (RASHPETCO)
Burullus Gas Company (BURULLUS)
El-Qantara Petroleum Company (QANTARA)
El-Mansoura Petroleum Company (MANSOURA)
Al-Rawda Petroleum Company (AL-RAWDA)
El-Wastani Petroleum Company (WASCO)
El-Manzalah Petroleum Company (El-MANZALA)
West Qantara Petroleum Company (PETRO QANTARA)
North Sinai Petroleum Company (NOSPCO)
Pharos Petroleum Company (PHPC)
North Bardawil Petroleum Company
(PETROBARDAWIL)
Thekah Petroleum Company (THEKAH)
North Idku Petroleum Company (NIPETCO)
Egyptian Natural Gas Company (GASCO)
Egyptian Town Gas (ETG)
Egypt Gas
TAQA Group:
 REPCO Gas
 Nile Valley Gas Company (NVGC)
 City Gas Company TRANS Gas Company
Fayum Gas Company
National Gas S.A.E
Sinai GAS
Cairo Gas
Regions Company (REGAS)
Maya Gas
Overseas gas
Nubaria Gas Company
Egyptian Natural Gas Company (GASCO)
United Gas Derivatives Company (UGDC)
•
Egyptian LNG (ELNG)
•
Spanish Egyptian Gas Company (SEGAS)
•
East Gas Company (EGC)
•
Natural Gas Vehicles Company (NGVC)
•
Egyptian International Gas Technology (GAS TEC)
•
Shell Compressed Natural Gas Egypt
•
Arabia Gas
•
Master Gas
•
Total Egypt
•
Sianco
•
Petroleum Trading Company (Petrotrade)
•
Egyptian Company for Gas Services (ECGS)

Affiliated companies of ECHEM
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Alexandria Specialty Petroleum Products Company (ASPPC)
Egyptian Petrochemicals Company (EPC)
Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals Company (Sidpec)
Egyptian Linear Alkyl Benzene Company (ELAB)
Egyptian propylene and poly propylene company (EPPC)
Egyptian Styrene and Polystyrene Company (Estyrenics)
Misr oil processing & fertilizers Company (Mopco)
Amreya Petroleum Refining Company (APRC)

Affiliated companies of GANOPE
1. Petrogulf Misr Company (Petrogulf )
2. Esh El Malaha Petroleum Company (Eshpetco)
3. Magawish Petroleum Company (Magapetco)
4. Gabal El Zeit Petroleum Company (Zeitco)
5. Wady El Sahl Petroleum Company (Waspetco)
6. Vegas Oil & Gas
7. East Zeit Petroleum Company (Petrozeit)
8. Assiut Petroleum Refining Co.
9. Nile Petroleum Marketing Co.
10. El Wadi El Gadid Co. for Mineral Resources and Oil Shale (WADI
CO.)
11. Wahet Paris for Natural Water Co.
12. El Wadi El Gadeed for Packing Co.
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APPENDIX 3
PUBLIC SECTOR PETROLEUM COMPANIES, OIL AND GAS
JOINT VENTURES WITH STATE PARTICIPATION, INVESTMENT
PETROLEUM COMPANIES, AND MULTI-NATIONAL PETROLEUM
COMPANIES.
Public Sector Petroleum companies
1- General Petroleum Company
2- Petroleum Pipelines Company
3- Misr Petroleum Company
4- Petroleum Cooperative Society Co.
5- Petroleum Gases Company (PETROGAS)
6- Suez Oil Processing Company (SOPC)
7- El Nasr Petroleum Co. (NPC)
8- Alexandria Petroleum Co. (APC)
9- Amerya Petroleum Refining Co. (APRC)
10- Egyptian Petrochemical Company (EPC)
11- Assuit Oil Refining Company
12- Cairo Oil Refining Co.

Source: Hard copy directory of Oil and Gas company
Oil and Gas Joint Ventures with State Participation
1- Gulf of Suez Petroleum Company (GUPCO)
2- Belayim Petroleum Co. (PETROBEL)
3- Badr Petroleum Co. (BAPETCO)
4- Agiba Petroleum Co.
5- PETROGULF MISR Company
6- Abu Qir Petroleum
7- Western Desert Petroleum Company (WEPCO )
8- Alamein Petroleum Co.
9- Petrosafe
10- Gebel El Zeit Petroleum Company (Petrozeit )
11- Khalda Petroleum Co.
12- Rashid Petroleum Co. (RashPetco)
13- Qarun Petroleum Co. (QPC)
14- GEMSA Petroleum Company (GEMPETCO)
15- East Zeit Petroleum Co. (ZEITCO)
16- Oasis Petroleum Company (OAPCO)
17- AL AMAL Petroleum Company (AMAPETCO)
18- Offshore Shukheir Oil Company (OSOCO)
19- Magawish Petroleum Co. (MAGAPETCO)
20- Suez Oil Co. (SUCO)
21- Esh El Mallaha Petroleum Company (ESHPETCO)
22- Wadi El Sahl Petroleum Company (WASPETCO)
23- South Dabaa Petroleum Co. (DAPETCO )
24- Fanar Petroleum Company (FANPETCO)
25- Gharib Oil Services Company
26- PETRODARA Co.
27- El Mansoura Petroleum company
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28- El Wastani Petroleum Company (WASCO)
29- North Bahariya Petroleum Co. (NORPETCO)
30- North Sinai Petroleum Company (NOSPCO )
31- West Bakr Petroleum Co.
32- EL Hamra Oil Co.
33- Marina Petroleum Company
34- North Alamein Petroleum Company ( NALPETCO)
35- Petro Amir petroleum company
36- Pharaonic Petroleum Company (PHPC )
37- South Abu Zenima Petroleum Company (Petrozenima)
38- PetroShahd Co.
39- Petrosilah
40- Petrosalam Company
41- PetroSannan Company

Source: Hard copy directory of Oil and Gas companies

Investment Petroleum companies
1- Arab Petroleum Pipelines Co. (SUMED)
2- The Petroleum Projects and Technical Consultations Company (PETROJET)
3- Petroleum Air services (PAS)
4- Engineering for the Petroleum & Process Industries (ENNPI)
5- Egypt Gas
6- Egyptian Drilling Company (EDC)
7- Natural Gas Vehicles Co. (NGV)
8- Egyptian International Gas Technology (GAS TEC)
9- Petroleum Safety and Environmental services Company (Petrosafe)
10- Egyptian Natural Gas Co. (GASCO)
11- Egyptian Maintenance Company (EMC)
12- Alexandria Petroleum Maintenance Company (PETROMAINT)
13- Middle East Oil Refinery Company (MIDOR)
14- Sidi Krir For Petrochemicals Co. (SIDPEC)
15- Egyptian Petroleum Services Company (EPSCO)
16- Alexandria Mineral Oils Co. (AMOC)
17- Alexandria Co. For Petroleum Additives (ACPA)
18- Misr Oil Processing Co. (MOPCO)
19- Middle East Oil Tankage and Pipelines (MIDTAP)
20- National Gas Company (NATGAS)
21- Alexandria Specially Petroleum Products Co. (ASPPC)
22- Alexandria National Refining and Petrochemicals Co. (ANRPC)
23- The Egyptian Co. For Transporting and Connecting Gas (BUTAGASCO)
24- National Gas (NG)
25- Sianco
26- Town Gas Company
27- Petroleum Marine Services Co. (PMS)
28- PETROMIN LUBRICATING OIL CO. (PETROLUB)
29- Nile Valley Gas Company (EMEC)
30- Oriental Petrochemicals Company (OPC)
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31- City Gas Co.
32- Repco Gas
33- Petroleum Trading Service Company (Petro Trade)
34- International Pipe Industry Co. (IPIC)
35- East Gas Co. (EGC)
36- Fayoum Gas Company
37- Egyptian Projects Operation and maintenance (EPROM)
38- Petrosport
39- United Gas Derivatives Co. (UGDC)
40- Egyptian Liquified Natural Gas (LNG)
41- Tharwa Co.
42- Emarat Misr Petroleum Products Company (Emarat Misr)
43- Arabia for Oil & Gas Lines (Altube)
44- Egyptian Fajr For Natural Gas Co. (EFNG)
45- Jordanian Egyptian Fajr for Natural Gas Transmission & Supply
46- Petro Enviromental Services Co. (PESCO)
47- Egyptian Linear Alkyl Benzene (ELAB)
48- Spanish Egyptian Gas Company (SEGAS)
49- Egyptian Valves Company (EVACO)
50- Transgas Company
51- Regional Oil & Gas Technology Transfer Co. (ROGTTC)
52- Shell Compressed Natural Gas Egypt (Gas Express)
53- Oil and Gas Skills (OGS)
54- Suez Safety Outfitters (SSO)
55- Syrian-Egyptian Company for Oil Services (SEPESCO)
56- The Egyptian Company for Refrigeration by Natural Gas (Gas Cool)
57- Sahara Petroleum Services Company S.A.E (SAPESCO)
58- The Egyptian Styrenics Production Co.
59- Egyptian Propylene & Polypropylene Company (EPPC)
60- Sino Tharwa Drilling Company
61- Petronas
62- Sonker Bunkering Company
63- Safy Egypt for Natural Gas Technology Compressed Company
64- Nile Oil Company
65- Egyptian Chinese Petroleum Rig Manufacturing Company (EPHH)
66- Ruhr Pumpen Egypt
67- Maridive & Oil Services S. A. E.
68- El Wadi El Gadid For Containers (WGC)
69- Al Wadi Al Gadid Co. for Mineral Resources and Oil Shale (Wadico)
70- Al Alameya for Manufacturing Petroleum Equipments (MegaTone)
71- Egyptian Methanex Methanol Company S.A.E. (EMethanex)
72- Arabia Gaz Company
73- Egyptian Nitrogen Products Company (ENPC)
74- Macoil Egypt
75- Medcarrier for CNG Transportation
76- House Gas Co.
77- Master Gas Co.
78- Paris Oasis Natural Water Co.
79- Petroleum Arrows Co.
80- Pharaonic Gas Company
81- Cairo Gas Co.
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82- Tharwa Breda Petroleum Service Co.
83- International Drilling Material Manufacturing Co. (IDM)
84- Regions Gas Company (REGAS)
85- Petroleum Development Co.
86- Megas
87- NAT Energy
88- Shabakat Natural Gas
89- National Petroleum Company (NPCO)
90- Egyptian Bahrain Gas Derivatives Company (EBGDCo)
91- Abu Qir Fertilizers Company
92- Kuwait Energy
93- El Sokhna for Refining and Petrochemicals (SRPC)
94- Kuwait Oil Company
95- Cairo Gas Co.
96- Sinai Gas
97- Hill International Petrol Egypt
98- Nile Gas
99- Egyptian Company for Maritime drilling
100- Sinai Company for Mining and Petroleum Services
101- TAQA Arabia for Gas
102- Soprema Egypt Company
103- Egyptian Petroleum Services Co. (EPSCO )
104- Egyptian Company for Gas Services (ECGS)
105- Egyptian Tantalem Co.
106- Egyptian Indian for Polyester Co. (EIPET)

Source: Hard copy directory of Oil and Gas companies

Multi-National Petroleum Companies
1- British Petroleum Egypt (BP)
2- Shell Egypt
3- Shell Marketing Egypt
4- R.W.E DEA Egypt
5- B.G EGYPT
6- Eni Ieoc
7- Dana Gas Oil
8- Egyptian Petroleum Development Co. Ltd.
9- Apache Egypt
10- IPR Group of Companies (Egypt)
11- IPR
12- Trident Petroleum Egypt
13- Vegas Oil & Gas S.A.
14- Melrose Resources Egypt Company
15- Trans Globe Energy Corporation
16- INA - Naftaplin
17- HBS International Egypt Ltd.
18- Alliance
19- Luk Oil
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20- Pico Energy Group
21- Baker Hughes E.H.O Ltd.
22- Schlumberger
23- Halliburton Energy Services Group
24- Total Egypt Co.
25- Libya Oil Egypt
26- Edison International - Egypt branch
27- Transocean international Ltd.
28- Enap Sipetrol
29- CGG Ardiseis
30- Exxon Mobil Co.
31- Gharib Oil Fields
32- Guide Geoscience Technologies
33- Massawa Petroleum Company
34- Gaz de France
35- Alex Oil S.A.
36- Egyptian Chinese Drilling Company (ECDC)
37- Shengli Bohai Drilling (SINODEC)
38- Hot Shot Egypt
39- pyramid Drilling Petroleum
40- Fugro SAE
41- Perenco
42- PETZED Investment & Project Management Ltd.
43- Eagle Marine
44- Dover Investments Ltd.
45- Swanco Group
46- Arabian Oil Company Ltd. (AOC)
47- Egypt Gas and Oil Services Company S.A.E (EGOSCO)
48- HESS Egypt
49- PICO Oil
50- Kufpec Egypt Limited
51- Tri- Ocean Energy
52- Chevron Egypt
53- Hellenic Petroleum S.A.
54- Ocean Marine Egypt (S.A.E)
55- Impresub International L.L.C
56- El Paso Exploration & Production
57- Senefro Supplies
58- Weatherford
59- NALCO
60- NAFTO Gaz of Ukraine
61- CEPSA EGYPT - Oil Exploration and Production
62- Merlon Petroleum El Fayum Company
63- PetroSA Egypt
64- Dana Petroleum
65- D-Trading Oil & Gas
66- State Oil Company
67- OMV EGYPT

Source: Hard copy directory of Oil and Gas companies
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APPENDIX 4

QUESTIONNAIRE

A Letter for Joint Venture Boards:
تاريخ

Date
Dear Sir :
The Government of Egypt places a high priority on
achieving rapid and sustainable growth in Egypt’s
economy. Good corporate governance has been
identified as an influential factor in enabling
companies to perform at a high level, and is
therefore also a priority of the government.
Governance takes on special importance in joint
ventures between public and private sector
companies, a common model in the petroleum
sector both worldwide and in Egypt.
The members of the board constitute the front line
in the drive to improve governance. We therefore
ask for your cooperation in filling out the attached
questionnaire, which asks for your opinions on the
functioning of the board on which you serve.

The questionnaire does not ask for any
information on the performance of the company,
only for your opinions. Please be assured that all
answers will be kept in the strictest confidence. To
assure this, the questionnaire does not ask for
your name or the name of the company on whose
board you serve. No individual or company-level
information will be included in the final report.
We appreciate your assistance in collecting this
information, which will help us to further
strengthen corporate governance in Egypt and to
advance our goal of maximizing corporate success
for the benefit of the citizens of Egypt.
Please complete the questionnaire and submit it
to [person receiving**] by [**date].

:سيدي العزيز
تضع حكومة مصر أولوية عالية لتحقيق النمو
السريع والمستدام في االقتصاد المصري وقد حدد
اإلدارة الحكيمة للشركا كعامل مؤثر في تمكين
 وبالتالي هو،عال
ٍ الشركا من أداء على مستوى
ايضا من اولويا الحكومة والحوكمه (او ما تعرف
بالحكم الرشيد) يتخذ بأهمية خاصة في المشاريع
المشتركة بين شركا القطاع العام والخاص نموذج
عام في قِطاع النفط على ح ٍد سواء في جميع انحاء
.العالم وفى مصر
ويشكل أعضاء المجلس الخط األمامي في حملة
تحسين الحوكمة ولِذلك نطلب تعاونكم في مِلء
 والذي يسأل عن أرائككم على أداء،االستبيان المرفق
.المجلس اإلدارة الذي تشاركون فيه
.
،وال يطلب االستبيان أي معلوما عن أداء الشركة
 لذا يرجى االطمئنان من أن جميع.اال آرائكم
اإلجابا ستبقى في سرية تامه. ولتأكيد هذا
االطمئنان لن يطلب االستبيان عن اسمكم او اسم
الشركة التي تخدم بها كعضو مجلس اإلدارة
ولن يتم أدراج أي معلوما على مستوى الفرد أو
.الشركة في التقرير النهائي
، ونحن نقدر مساعدتكم في جمع هذه المعلوما
والتي سوف تساعدنا على تعزيز حوكمة الشركا
في مصر ودفع هدفنا المتمثل في تعظيم نجاح
الشركا لصالح المواطنين في مصر.
)يرجى ملء االستبيان وتقديمه الى (الشخص المتلقي
)من قبل (تاريخ
،

Regards,
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التحيا

Questionnaire for Members of Joint Venture Boards in the Oil and Gas
Sector in Egypt
The following questionnaire has been developed to collect the opinions of board members on the
operation of the boards of directors of joint venture companies in the petroleum/natural gas sector in
Egypt. It is part of a research project on the operation of the boards of state-owned companies in the
Middle East, which is being conducted under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development.
The purpose of the research is to understand how boards operate. The information will not be used to
assess how specific company boards operate or to compare companies to one another. No information on
specific companies will be included in the report.
Please be assured that no information will be included in any reports or published material resulting from
this research that could identify you, your personal answers, or your company. To assure confidentiality,
we are not collecting information on names of individuals or their companies in the questionnaire. All
data from individual questionnaires will be held in the strictest confidentiality. By filling out this
questionnaire you express your willingness to participate in the study and your understanding that all data
on individuals’ answers will be kept strictly confidential.
This questionnaire is closely based on one developed for the Gulf Cooperation Council Board of
Directors Institute by McKinsey, and is used with the kind permission of the GCCBDI. It has been
modified to reduce the number of questions and to better meet the purpose of this study.
Your participation is very much appreciated.
1- Please tell us a little about yourself:
a. Do you have a position in the company other than board membership?
Yes/no
b. Your nationality
Fill in
c. Organization you represent on the board
Choice of options
d. Number of corporate boards you currently serve on, including this board
Fill in
e. Number of corporate boards you have ever served on, including this board
Fill in
f. BA/BSc field (e.g., engineering, law)
Fill in
2. Board composition and director capabilities
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
2.1 Board composition and diversity
A. The Board has an effective process for nominating and appointing new directors
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. The Board is close to the right size for us to work together effectively
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. The Board has among its members the right mix of industrial and functional expertise
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. The number of independent directors on the Board is sufficient to ensure the Board's
independence
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
E. There is sufficient diversity in opinions and perspectives within the Board
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
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F. Board members’ tenure is adequately long to ensure accountability
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
G. Board members rotate at an adequate rate to allow new talent to join the Board
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
2.2 Specific industrial and functional expertise
A. One or more Board members have substantial expertise on core governance and compliance,
e.g., nomination, compensation, audit, disclosure
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. One or more Board members have substantial industry/sector expertise, e.g., customer drivers
and trends, competitive conditions
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. One or more Board members have substantial functional expertise in the following areas:
marketing, finance, risk management, and operations
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
2.3 Capabilities and knowledge development
A. The Board has a formal development program for new Board members
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. Board members are effective at learning about new ideas or issues that have implications for the
future of the organization
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. Board members keep abreast of broad industry trends individually (e.g., through participation in
conferences and events)
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
3. Director roles and accountabilities
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
3.1 Director roles and accountabilities
A. The Board devotes sufficient time to defining each member's role and responsibilities
B. Board members have a clear understanding of their own specific roles and responsibilities
regarding the board
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. Board members have a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of all other Board
members
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. The Board acts in the best interest of all stakeholders without bias to any particular shareholder
or stakeholder
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
E. Board members actively disclose conflicts of interest when they occur in Board discussions
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
F. The Board handles conflicts of interests appropriately (e.g., exclude the conflicted member from
discussion or voting)
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
3.2 Roles and responsibilities of Board committees
A. Board committees have clear roles and responsibilities
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. All Board members are fully aware of the roles and responsibilities of Board committees
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. The Board has an audit committee with a majority of independent members
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. The Board executive committee has a low level of authority and it does not act on behalf of the
136

Board in major decisions
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
3.3 Board processes and protocols
A. The Board has access to adequate, relevant, and timely information
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. The materials for the Board meetings are sent out well in advance of the meeting
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. The Board has sufficient access to senior executives
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. Board meetings occur at the right frequency
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
E. The Board meeting agenda prioritizes the right topics for discussion
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
F. The materials prepared for Board meetings effectively address the topics for discussion
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
G. Preparation materials are concise and easy to read and understand
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
4. Delivery on roles of the Board
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
4.1 Strategy
A. Board members are sufficiently involved in strategy development
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. Board members spend enough time discussing strategy issues
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. Board members all agree on the challenges and opportunities the organization is facing
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. The Board has a clear strategy to respond to these challenges and opportunities
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
E. All Board members agree that the Board has the right strategy
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
F. The Board has a robust strategy implementation plan with clear accountabilities and follow up
process
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
4.2 Performance management
A. The Board is effectively involved in managing business performance
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. The Board spends sufficient time discussing performance management topics
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. The Board has a real understanding of how well the organization is performing
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. The Board is tracking a set of performance indicators (e.g., ROE, sales, profit)
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
E. The Board is tracking a set of health indicators (e.g., employees attrition rate, customer
satisfaction, new products share of revenue)
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
F. The Board discusses performance and health indicators frequently with senior management,
focusing on improvement opportunities
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
G. The Board rigorously follows up on identified improvement actions
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( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
4.3 Attitudes toward company performance issues
A. It is appropriate to eliminate jobs if this is necessary to increase the company's profitability
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. The company should consult with the communities where it operates on issues that would affect
them
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. The company should act to minimize possible negative impacts on the community, even if there
is no legal requirement to do so
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. The company should not enter into risky projects even if they might generate a high rate of
profit
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
E. All shareholders, including the public, have a right to know the details on the company's
financial performance
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
F. The company should give preference to local suppliers, even if they are more expensive or offer
a lower quality
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
G. The company should disclose full information on its environmental performance to the public
and the community
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
5. Delivery on roles of the Board
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
5.1 Risk management
A. The Board is effectively involved in setting the risk appetite of the company
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. The Board spends sufficient time discussing risk management issues
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. The Board has a clear visibility on the top-5 risks facing the company
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. A full assessment is conducted of the impact of these risks on company financials (cash flow)
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
E. The Board spends sufficient time to ensure integrity of companies accounting and financial
reporting systems
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
5.2 Talent management
A. The Board is effectively involved in talent management (i.e., selection, compensation,
evaluation, development, and succession planning of critical positions in the top management
team)
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. The Board spends sufficient time discussing talent management issues
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. The Board has a documented process of succession plans for all critical positions
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
6. Effective dynamics
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
6.1 Preparation and participation
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A. All Board members prepare well for Board meetings
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. All Board members are engaged in Board discussions
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. Board members are always clear on the purpose of their discussions
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. Board members are open and honest with each other during their discussions
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
E. The Board uses the right type, quality, and quantity of information to support discussions (e.g.,
appropriate balance between presentations and discussions)
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
6.2 Challenge and conflict
A. The Board encourages and values discussion of different options and viewpoints
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. The Board members are comfortable challenging each other to ensure the Board arrives at the
best outcome
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. The Board is able to reach closure on difficult decisions
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. Disagreements among Board members are resolved constructively and without personal
animosity
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
6.3 Effective dynamics
A. The Board's approach to decision making is transparent, fair, and efficient
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. The chairman facilitates Board decision making rather than making decisions on behalf of the
Board ( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. Every discussion ends with a clear set of next steps: who will do what, by when
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
6.4 Interaction with senior management
A. The Board and senior management team have the right frequency of meetings together
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. Meetings between the Board and senior management team provide a forum for open and honest
discussion ( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. Board members and senior management constructively challenge each other's ideas in Board
meetings ( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. There is a culture of trust and respect between Board members and senior management
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
7. Overall Board effectiveness and renewal
The following questions are designed to assess your perspective of the effectiveness of the Board. For
each of the following statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.
7.1 Board evaluation
A. The effectiveness of Board meetings is discussed afterwards
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. The Board evaluates individual directors on their performance at least annually
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. The Board evaluates its collective performance as a team at least annually
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
7.2 Board renewal
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A. The Board takes the time to step back and reflect on how effective it is and what the challenges
and opportunities for improvement are
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
B. The Board is flexible enough to reprioritize when the situation demands it
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
C. The Board is good at putting an end to things that no longer merit time or effort
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree
D. The Board is open to new ways of doing things
( ) Strongly Agree ( ) Agree ( ) Neutral ( ) Disagree ( ) Strongly Disagree

140

استبيان ألعضاء مجالس الشركات المشتركة في قطاع النفط والغاز في مصر:
لقد تم تطوير االستبيان التالي لجمع أراء اعضاء المجلس عن عمل مجالس إدارا الشركا المشتركة في قطاع البترول والغاز الطبيعي
في مصر وهو جزء من مشروح بحثي عن عمل مجالس إدارا الشركا المملوكة للدولة في منطقة الشرق األوسط والتي تجرى تح
.رعاية منظمة التعاون والتنمية االقتصادية
والغرض من هذا البحث هو أن نفهم كيف تعمل مجالس اإلدارا مع العلم أن هذه المعلوما لن تستخدم لتقييم عمل مجالس اإلدارا أو
.لمقارنة الشركا بعضها ببعض ولن يتم إدراج أي معلوما عن شركا محددة في هذا التقرير
برجاء االطمئنان بأنه لن يتم تضمين أي معلوما في أية تقارير او مادة منشورة ناجمة عن هذا البحث الذي يمكن التعرف عليكم وعلى
أجابتكم الشخصية أو شركتكم .ولضمان السرية نحن ال نقوم بجمع معلوما عن أسماء األفراد أو شركاتهم في هذا االستبيان كما أنه سيتم
التعامل مع كافة البيانا بسرية تامة ،وعن طريق ملء هذا االستبيان يمكنكم التعبير عن استعدادكم للمشاركة في الدراسة وفهمكم أن
.جميع البيانا الخاصة بإجاباتكم ستحاط بسرية تامة
ويستند هذا على أحد االستبيانا الذي تم تطويره لصالح مجلس ادارة مجلس التعاون الخليجي من قبل معهد مكينزى ويستخدم بإذن ودي
.من مجلس إدارة مجلس التعاون الخليجي حيث تم تعديله للحد من عدد األسئلة ولتحسين تلبية الغرض من هذه الدراسة
مشاركاتكم موضع تقدير كبير
تحياتي
الباحث

يرجى التحدث عن أنفسكم قليال:
نعم /ال هل تشغل وظيفة في الشركة عالوة على عضويتكم في مجلس اإلدارة؟ ( )
الجنسية
الهيئة التي تمثلها في المجلس
عدد مجالس إدارات الشركات التي تعمل بها حاليا بما في ذلك مجلس اإلدارة هذا
عدد مجالس إدارات الشركات التي عملت بها بما في ذلك مجلس اإلدارة هذا
المؤهل العلمي (على سبيل المثال هندسة-قانون ---الخ(
تشكيل المجلس وقدرات العضو
صمم األسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظرك عن فعالية المجلس ولكل من العبارا التالية يرجى اإلشارة إلى مستوى من االتفاق او
االختالف
تشكيل المجلس والتنوع
للمجلس فعالية لترشيح وتعيين أعضاء جدد
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

المجلس قريب من الوضع الحقيقي لنا للعمل معا ً بشكل فعال

() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

للمجلس المزيج المناسب من الخبرة الصناعية والفنية بين أعضائه
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
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)(ال أوافق بشده

عدد المديرين المستقلين في المجلس يكفي لضمان استقاللية المجلس
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

هناك ما يكفي من التنوع في اآلراء ووجها النظر داخل المجلس
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

مدة عضوية المجلس طويلة على نحو كاف لضمان المساءلة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

ف تسمح بانضمام مواهب جديدة إلى المجلس
يتناوب أعضاء المجلس بمعدل كا ٍ
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

الخبرة الصناعية والفنية النوعية
واحد أو أكثر من أعضاء المجلس لدية خبرة كبيرة عن الحكومة واالمتثال للوائح وقوانين على سبيل المثال الترشيح والتعويض
والمراجعة وكشف األمور
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

واحد أو أكثر من أعضاء المجلس لدية خبرة كبيرة في القطاع او الصناعة ،على سبيل المثال لديه خبره في اجتذاب اعداد كبيره من
العمالء او مواكبه المناخ التنافسي الموجود
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

واحد أو أكثر من أعضاء المجلس لدية خبرة فنية كبيرة في المجاال األتية :التسويق والمالية وإدارة المخاطر والعمليا
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

142

تطوير القدرات والمعرفة
المجلس لدية برنامج تنمية رسمي ألعضاء مجلس إدارة جدد
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

للمجلس فعالية في التعرف على أفكار جديدة أو قضايا لها آثار على مستقبل المنظمة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يواكب أعضاء المجلس االتجاها الصناعية المتنوعة بشكل فردى (على سبيل المثال من خالل المشاركة في المؤتمرا واألحداث (
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

أدوار ومحاسبات عضو المجلس
صمم األسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظرك في فعالية المجلس لكل من العبارا التالية يرجى اإلشارة إلى مستوى االتفاق أو االختالف
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أدوار ومحاسبات عضو المجلس
يكرس المجلس وقتا ً كافيا ً لتحديد دور ومسئوليا كل عضو
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى أعضاء المجلس فهم واضح ألدواهم ومسئولياتهم النوعية تجاه المجلس
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى أعضاء المجلس فهم واضح ألدوار ومسئوليا جميع أعضاء المجلس اآلخرين
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يعمل المجلس من أجل تحقيق أفضل مصلحة لكافة األطراف المشاركة دون التحيز إلى أي مساهم خاص أو أي طرف مشارك
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يكشف أعضاء المجلس بفاعلية تضارب المصالح عندما تحدث في مناقشا المجلس
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يتعامل المجلس مع تضارب المصالح بشكل مناسب (على سبيل المثال :استبعاد العضو المنازع من المناقشة أو التصوي (
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

أدوار ومسئوليات لجان المجلس
لدى لجان المجلس أدوار ومسئوليا واضحة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

جميع أعضاء المجلس على دراية تامة ألدوار ومسئوليا لجان المجلس
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى المجلس لجنة مراجعه يشغلها أغلبية من األعضاء المستقلين
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
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)(ال أوافق بشده

الجنة التنفيذية للمجلس لديها مستوى منخفض من السلطة وال تنيب عن المجلس في القرارا الرئيسية
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

أعمال وبروتوكوالت المجلس
لدى المجلس حق الوصول إلى المعلوما الكافية ذا الصلة وفي الوق المناسب
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يتم إرسال مواد (مذكرا ) اجتماع المجلس قبل عقد االجتماع
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى المجلس حق الوصول الكافي لكبار المسئولين التنفيذيين
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

تعقد اجتماعا مجلس اإلدارة بمعدل مناسب
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يعطى جدول أعمال المجلس األولوية لمناقشة الموضوعا الهامة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

تنصب المواد (المذكرا ) المعدة للمجلس بفاعلية على الموضوعا المخصصة للمناقشة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

المواد (المذكرا )المعدة مختصرة وسهلة القراءة والفهم
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

تسليم أدوار المجلس
صمم األسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظركم في فعالية المجلس ولكل من العبارا التالية يرجى اإلشارة إلى مستوى من االتفاق أو
االختالف
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االستراتيجية
يشارك أعضاء المجلس بما فيه الكفاية في تنمية االستراتيجية
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يقضى أعضاء المجلس وقتا ً كافيا ً لمناقشة القضايا االستراتيجية

() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يتفق جميع أعضاء المجلس على التحديا التي تواجهها المنظمة وايضا الفرص التي تسنح لها
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى المجلس استراتيجية واضحة للرد على تلك التحديا والفرص
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

جميع أعضاء المجلس متفقون على أن لدى المجلس استراتيجية صحيحة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى المجلس خطة تنفيذيه استراتيجية قوية تتسم بعملية مساءلة ومتابعه واضحة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده
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إدارة األداء
يشارك المجلس بشكل فعال في إدارة تقييم أداء األعمال
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يقضى المجلس وقتا كافيا ً لمناقشة موضوعا إدارة األداء

() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى المجلس فهم حقيقي لمدى عمل المنظمة بشكل سليم وناجح
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يتبع المجلس مجموعة من مؤشرا األداء (على سبيل المثال مؤشرا العائد على حقوق المساهمين او المبيعا

او األرباح (

() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يتبع المجلس مجموعة من المؤشرا الصحية (على سبيل المثال :مؤشرا معدل ترك الموظفين لوظائفهم او رضا العمالء او حصة
المنتجا الجديدة من الربح (
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يناقش المجلس األداء والمؤشرا الصحية في كثير من األحيان مع اإلدارة العليا مع التركيز على فرص التحسين
يتابع المجلس بدقة أعمال التحسين المحددة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

147

اتجاهات نحو قضايا أداء الشركة
من المناسب الغاء الوظائف إذا كان هذا ضروريا لزيادة ربحية الشركة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

ينبغي للشركة أن تتشاور مع المجتمع حيث أن الشركة تعمل على القضايا التي من شأنها أن تؤثر عليهم
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

ينبغي للشركة أن تعمل على تقليل األثار السلبية المحتملة على المجتمع حتى في عدم وجود أي مطلب قانونيا لذلك
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

ينبغي للشركة أال تدخل في مشروعا ذا مخاطر حتى لو كان قد تولد نسبة عالية من األرباح
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

جميع المساهمين بما في ذلك الجمهور لهم الحق في معرفة تفاصيل األداء المالي للشركة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

ينبغي للشركة أن تعطى األولوية للموردين المحليين حتى إذا كانوا أغلى أو أقل جودة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يجب على الشركة اإلفصاح عن معلوما كاملة عن أدائها البيئي للجمهور والمجتمع
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

تسليم أدوار المجلس
صمم األسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظرك في فعالية المجلس ولكل من العبارا التالية ،يرجى اإلشارة إلى مستوى االتفاق أو
االختالف
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إدارة المخاطر
يشارك المجلس بشكل فعال في تحديد رغبة الشركة في خوض أي مخاطرة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يقضى المجلس وقتا ً كافيا ً لمناقشة قضايا ً إدارة المخاطر
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى المجلس رؤية واضحة ألعلى خمس مخاطر تواجه الشركة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

إجراء تقييم كامل على أثر تلك المخاطر على ماليا الشركة (التدفق النقدي
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

المجلس يقضى وقتا ً كافيا لضمان سالمة نظم التقارير المحاسبية والمالية

() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

إدارة المواهب
يشارك المجلس بشكل فعال في إدارة المواهب (على سبيل المثال :االختيار او التعويض او التقييم او التنمية او التخطيط لخالفة
وظائف اإلدارة العليا الهامة)
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يقضى المجلس وقتا ً كافيا ً لمناقشة قضايا ً إدارة المواهب

() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى المجلس عملية موثقة لخطط الخالفة لجميع المناصب الهامة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

الديناميكية الفعالة
صمم األسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظرك في فعالية المجلس ولكل من العبارا التالية يرجى اإلشارة إلى مستوى من االتفاق أو
االختالف
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اإلعداد والمشاركة
هناك إعداد جيد الجتماعا مجلس اإلدارة من قبل جميع أعضاء المجلس
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يشارك جميع أعضاء المجلس في مناقشا المجلس
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

أعضاء المجلس على وضوح دائم عن الغرض من مناقشاتهم
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

أعضاء المجلس لديهم الصراحة والنزاهة مع بعضهم البعض أثناء المناقشة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يستخدم المجلس النوع والكيف والكم الصحيح من المعلوما لدعم المناقشا (على سبيل المثال :التوازن المناسب بين ما هو مطروح
ومناقشاته)
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

التحدي والصراع
يشجع المجلس ويقيم مناقشة الخيارا ووجها النظر المختلفة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

أعضاء المجلس في تحدى مسالم مع بعضهم البعض لضمان وصول المجلس الى أفضل النتائج
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يملك المجلس المقدرة على الوصول الى النقطة الفاصلة عند القرارا الصعبة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يتم حل الخالفا بين أعضاء المجلس بطريقة بناءة وبدون عداء شخصي
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
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() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

الديناميكية الفعالة
يتسم نهج المجلس في اتخاذ القرارا بالشفافية والعدالة والكفاءة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يقدم رئيس المجلس التسهيال للمجلس لصنع القرار بدالً من صنع القرارا نيابة عن المجلس

() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

ينتهي كل نقاش بمجموعة واضحة من الخطوا التالية :من سيفعل ماذا ومتى
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

التفاعل مع اإلدارة العليا
يجتمع مجلس اإلدارة وفريق اإلدارة العليا بمعدل مناسب معا ً
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

توفر االجتماعا بين مجلس اإلدارة وفريق اإلدارة العليا منتدى للمناقشة الحرة والنزيهة
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يقوم أعضاء المجلس واإلدارة العليا بالتحدي البناء ألفكار بعضهم البعض في اجتماعا المجلس
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

هناك ثقافة الثقة واالحترام بين أعضاء المجلس واإلدارة العليا
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

الفعالية والتجديد الشامل للمجلس
صمم األسئلة التالية لتقييم وجهة نظركم في فعالية المجلس ولكل من العبارا التالية يرجى اإلشارة إلى مستوى من االتفاق أو
االختالف
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تقييم المجلس
يتم مناقشة فعالية اجتماعا المجلس فيما بعد
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يتم تقييم المجلس ألداء أعضاءه منفردين على األقل سنويا ً

() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

يقوم المجلس بتقييم أدائهم الجماعي كفريق على األقل سنويا
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

تحديث مجلس اإلدارة
يأخذ المجلس الوق للرجوع خطوة إلى الوراء والتفكير في مدى فعاليته والتحديا والفرص المتاحة للتحسين
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى المجلس المرونة الكافية إلعادة تحديد األولويا عندما يتطلب الموقف ذلك
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده

لدى المجلس الصالحية في وضع حد لألشياء التي لم تعد تستحق الوق أو الجهد
() أوافق بشده
() أوافق
() على الحياد
() ال أوافق
)(ال أوافق بشده
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